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GAY RIGHTS, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND THE
CLASSIFICATION-FRAMING QUANDARY
Peter Nicolas*
INTRODUCTION
When the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear and decide
two cases involving same-sex marriage in its 2012 Term, there was rampant
speculation among legal pundits regarding the outcome, scope, and ra-
tionale of those decisions. One case involved a challenge to the portion of
the federal Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") refusing to recognize
same-sex marriages for federal law purposes,' and the other involved a
challenge to California's Proposition 8 (an amendment to the state's consti-
tution prohibiting same-sex marriage enacted after the state's highest court
had declared such a right to exist).' In deciding the cases, would the Court
rule in favor of the gay and lesbian plaintiffs? Would it issue a sweeping
decision giving gays and lesbians the right to marry nationwide, or a nar-
rower decision limited to the facts of those specific cases? Would the Court
declare sexual orientation to be a suspect or quasi-suspect classification for
equal protection purposes; decide that the plaintiffs' fundamental right to
marry had been infringed; or apply some stealth form of "rational basis
plus" scrutiny to declare the laws unconstitutional? Would the Court even
reach the merits, or instead dispose of both cases on procedural grounds?
Ultimately, the Court delivered victories for the gay and lesbian plain-
tiffs in both cases, although neither decision broached the more sweeping
questions regarding the fundamental right to marry or whether sexual orien-
tation classifications should be subjected to heightened equal protection
scrutiny. Instead, the Court disposed of Hollingsworth v. Perry' on standing
* Jeffrey & Susan Brotman Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Gender, Women & Sexu-
ality Studies, University of Washington. I wish to thank Professors Helen A. Anderson, Robert T. An-
derson, Tom Cobb, Mary D. Fan, Kellye Y. Testy, and Kathryn Watts for their valuable comments and
suggestions.
1 See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 2012), aff'd, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
Specifically, the case involved a challenge to that portion of DOMA providing that "[i]n determining the
meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administra-
tive bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." I U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
2 See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
3 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
GEO. MASON L. REV.
grounds, thereby allowing a federal district court decision declaring Propo-
sition 8 unconstitutional to stand.' In United States v. Windsor the Court
struck down the section of DOMA that refused to recognize same-sex mar-
riages for federal law purposes.6 The Court applied what appeared to be
rational basis equal protection scrutiny,7 or arguably "rational basis plus"
with some substantive due process and federalism principles thrown in.'
Commentators and lower courts will speculate for some time on the
actual holding and potential sweep of the Court's decision in Windsor, as
well as how the Court might have resolved Perry on the merits. Of at least
equal and perhaps greater importance, however, is a subtle yet critical unre-
solved threshold question lurking in the background of these two decisions,
as well as in numerous other cases percolating in the lower courts regarding
claims by gay and lesbian plaintiffs. This unresolved question is vital to
mounting a successful equal protection challenge: is there any "discrinmina-
tion" as equal protection precedents define that concept, and if so, what is
the nature of the classification?
4 Following this procedural path is consistent with the Court's post-Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), pre-Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), encounters with challenges to laws
banning interracial marriage. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (mem.) (deciding not to reach the
merits of a case challenging Virginia's law prohibiting interracial marriage on the ground that inadequa-
cy of the factual record and the inability of the lower courts to rectify that inadequacy "leaves the case
devoid of a properly presented federal question"). These cases illustrate the convenient method of "dis-
posing of a case while avoiding judgment on the constitutional issue that it raises" when-for political
reasons-the Court is not yet prepared to issue a decision invalidating a law but also does not wish to
give it the Court's stamp of approval. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 169 (1962).
5 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
6 Id. at 2682.
7 Deciding the case on narrow grounds is consistent with the Court's history with gay rights cases
specifically and cases touching on sensitive social issues generally. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (declaring a sodomy law targeting same-sex sodomy to violate substantive due
process, without articulating the level of scrutiny applied); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 635-36
(1996) (declaring an amendment to Colorado's constitution prohibiting protected status for those with a
"homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation" unconstitutional on equal protection grounds without
articulating the level of scrutiny applied (internal quotation marks omitted)); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (declaring racially segregated schools to be unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds without articulating the level of scrutiny applied or the potential applicability of the principle
outside of school segregation).
8 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("I think the majority goes off
course... but it is undeniable that its judgment is based on federalism."); id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) ("In accord with my previously expressed skepticism about the Court's 'tiers of scrutiny' approach,
I would review this classification only for its rationality. As nearly as I can tell, the Court agrees with
that; its opinion does not apply strict scrutiny, and its central propositions are taken from rational-basis
cases .... But the Court certainly does not apply anything that resembles that deferential framework."
(citation omitted)); id. at 2707 ("The sum of all the Court's nonspecific hand-waving is that this law is
invalid (maybe on equal-protection grounds, maybe on substantive-due-process grounds, and perhaps
with some amorphous federalism component playing a role) .... ).
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To those unfamiliar with the peculiarities of equal protection jurispru-
dence, the question seems absurd. Of course there is discrimination, at least
in the sense that most people think of the term: gays and lesbians wish to
marry, but they are prohibited by state law from doing so. However, a
threshold requirement for bringing an equal protection claim is a showing
that the law in question intentionally discriminates against a given class of
persons. This threshold showing is satisfied when a law-on its face-
discriminates against a given class of persons.9 But when a law is facially
neutral, mere evidence that it has a discriminatory effect on a given class of
persons is typically insufficient to satisfy this threshold requirement." Ab-
sent evidence that a facially neutral law was either administered in a dis-
criminatory manner or motivated by a discriminatory purpose, there is no
discrimination within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and thus
the claim fails at the outset."
Invoking this line of cases, supporters of laws prohibiting same-sex
marriage, same-sex adoption, and benefits for unmarried same-sex part-
ners-and many of the judicial opinions addressing their constitutionality-
note that such laws, on their face, make no reference whatsoever to the sex-
ual orientation of the people seeking to marry, adopt, or obtain benefits. 2
Proponents further note that no inquiry regarding anyone's sexual orienta-
tion is made at any point in the process of enforcing the laws.'3 Rather, pro-
ponents argue that these laws inquire only into the sex of the applicants,
requiring merely that the applicants be of different sexes. 4 Thus defenders
of these laws declare that gays and lesbians are not discriminated against
since they remain free to marry, jointly adopt a child, or seek benefits for a
partner, so long as the person they seek to marry, jointly adopt a child with,
or seek benefits for is of the opposite sex. Under these laws, the argument
goes, heterosexuals are likewise prohibited from marrying, jointly adopting
a child with, or seeking benefits for someone of the same sex.
Proponents acknowledge that such laws might disproportionately im-
pact gays and lesbians, but they note that when a law is facially neutral
mere evidence that it has a discriminatory effect, without more, fails to sat-
isfy the threshold requirement for making out an equal protection claim. As
such, it becomes unnecessary for the court to determine the level of judicial
scrutiny applicable to laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion, or whether the laws at issue satisfy that level of judicial scrutiny. 5
9 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 n.10 (1985) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880)).
10 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
1 See infra notes 32-65.
12 See infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 56-65.
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In response to such arguments, opponents of such laws contend that
this only strengthens their case. After all, sex discrimination is already sub-
ject to intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, 6 and the
contention that the laws are facially about sex and not sexual orientation
thus makes the case for applying heightened scrutiny more straightfor-
ward. 7 Yet once again, defenders of such laws-and many of the judicial
opinions addressing their constitutionality-ask, "Where is the discrimina-
tion?" Yes, they acknowledge, sex is taken into account, but there is no sex
discrimination, in that men and women are treated in exactly the same way.
Both men and women are equally prohibited from marrying someone of the
same sex. Thus, under the "equal application" theory,'" these courts con-
clude that bans on same-sex marriage are also neutral as to sex. 9 Accord-
ingly, while opponents of such laws assert facial discrimination on the ba-
ses of sexual orientation and sex, supporters of such laws contend that the
laws are facially neutral on both.
Other laws currently being challenged in the lower courts are arguably
even further removed from being facially discriminatory on the basis of
sexual orientation or sex. Laws being challenged in Arizona and Michigan,
for example, do not explicitly say anything on their face about gay or lesbi-
an persons or even same-sex couples. The Arizona law provides that health
benefits can only be provided to the children or "spouse" of public employ-
ees. Only when the law is considered in conjunction with Arizona's consti-
tutional ban on same-sex marriage does the discrimination against same-sex
couples-and by extension, gay and lesbian persons-become apparent."
The Michigan law provides that health benefits can only be provided to
those who are married to, a dependent of, or otherwise eligible to inherit
from a public employee under the state's law of intestate succession.2 As
with the Arizona law, it is only by reference to other laws-including the
state's ban on same-sex marriage-that the discrimination becomes evi-
dent.22
16 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976).
17 See infra notes 152-155 and accompanying text.
18 See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883) (upholding a law punishing interracial fornica-
tion and adultery more severely than the same conduct involving persons of the same race), overruled in
part by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967)
(referring to it as the .'equal application' theory").
19 See infra notes156-161 and accompanying text.
20 See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX, § 1;
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-651(0) (2011)).
21 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.583 (West Supp. 2013).
22 See MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25 (declaring marriage between one man and one woman the only
form of marriage permissible); I.R.C. § 152 (2006) (defining dependents under the Internal Revenue
Code); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 551.7, .271 (West 2006) (governing solemnization and recognition
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Cases involving constitutional claims of discrimination against gays
and lesbians can thus be divided into three categories, each of which is ar-
guably an additional step removed from being discriminatory for equal pro-
tection purposes. The first category consists of those laws that are clearly
discriminatory for equal protection purposes in that they facially provide for
unequal treatment because of a person's specific sexual orientation. Colora-
do's Amendment 2 is a rare example of such a law.2 3 Amendment 2 sub-
jected those with a "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation" to differ-
ential treatment and was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Romer v. Evans.24
The second category of claims involves same-sex conduct laws that
discriminate against conduct only when it is performed by two people of the
same sex, such as same-sex marriage, adoption, sexual conduct, or sharing
of benefits.25 When such laws are challenged on equal protection grounds,
they can theoretically be defended on the ground that they neither discrimi-
nate on the basis of sexual orientation nor sex. As far as sexual orientation
is concerned, such laws can be characterized as facially neutral in that they
do not prohibit gays and lesbians from marrying, adopting, and the like-so
long as they do not seek to do so with someone of the same sex.26 Similarly,
conduct-based laws can be characterized as facially neutral because one
who engages in same-sex marriage, adoption, sexual conduct, or sharing of
benefits need not necessarily be gay or lesbian. Such laws can also be de-
fended on the ground that they do not discriminate on the basis of sex, since
men and women are treated equally. Under conduct-based laws, both sexes
are prohibited from engaging in same-sex conduct.
The third category of claims includes cross-referenced same-sex con-
duct laws that are arguably yet another step removed from being facially
discriminatory. 7 On their face, cross-referenced same-sex conduct laws
neither call out gay and lesbian individuals nor same-sex couples for differ-
ential treatment. Rather, such laws provide that some sort of benefit is only
available to those who satisfy another, cross-referenced statute, such as the
state's marriage laws. It is only in conjunction with those cross-referenced
statutes that the discrimination against same-sex couples, and by extension
gays and lesbians, becomes apparent-such as when cross-referenced mar-
riage laws prohibit same-sex marriage.
In this Article, I attempt to resolve the classification-framing quandary
created by equal protection claims brought by gays and lesbians against
of marriages); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 700.2101-.2103 (West 2002) (providing rules of intestate
succession).
23 See COLO. CONST. art. 11, § 30b.
24 517 U.S. 620, 624, 635-36 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25 See infra note 52-65 and accompanying text.
26 See infra note 52-65 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 189-206 and accompanying text.
GEO. MASON L. REV.
laws falling into these latter two categories. The quandary is the result of
two separate lines of equal protection precedents invoked in tandem in the
same-sex marriage, benefit, and conduct cases. The first of these is a line of
cases requiring that, in the absence of facial discrimination, plaintiffs suc-
cessfully identify a law's discriminatory purpose, or show that the law is
being applied in an inequitable manner.28 The second line of cases holds
that even when a law references sex on its face, the law is nonetheless con-
sidered facially neutral so long as its restrictions apply equally to members
of both sexes.29 In response to the resulting classification-framing quandary,
this Article will consider whether it is possible for gay and lesbian plaintiffs
to navigate between the Scylla of the discriminatory purpose requirement
and the Charybdis of the equal application theory so as to satisfy the
threshold requirement for bringing equal protection challenges against such
laws. This Article demonstrates that although these laws raise complex
framing issues, they should be characterized as purposefully discriminating
on the bases of sexual orientation and sex, as well as against same-sex cou-
ples, and that any of three characterizations should suffice to get same-sex
conduct equal protection claims past the threshold discrimination inquiry.
Part I of this Article examines the application of the discriminatory
purpose requirement to claims that same-sex conduct laws discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation. Part II examines the application of the equal
application theory to claims that same-sex conduct laws discriminate on the
basis of sex. Part III considers an alternative method of framing such
claims-as discrimination against same-sex couples-to navigate between
the discriminatory purpose requirement and the equal application theory.
Part IV considers cross-referenced same-sex conduct laws and whether they
are distinguishable from laws that directly reference same-sex conduct. Part
V surveys the Supreme Court's existing gay rights precedents to determine
the extent to which the Court has provided guidance on how to resolve the
classification-framing quandary presented by laws regulating same-sex
conduct.
I. SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION AND THE SCYLLA OF THE
DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE REQUIREMENT
A threshold requirement for making out an equal protection claim is a
showing that a law discriminates against a given class.30 If a statute overtly
discriminates on some basis, such facial discrimination standing on its own
28 See infra Part l.A.
29 See infra Part l.B.
30 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 n.10 (1985) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880)).
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suffices to satisfy this threshold requirement.3 ' Thus, for example, if a stat-
ute in terms provides a preference for men over women, or a statute denies
a right to someone because they are African-American, the threshold re-
quirement is satisfied.
A. Proving Discriminatory Purpose in the Absence of Facial
Discrimination
With the passage of time and knowledge of the constitutional ramifica-
tions of enacting discriminatory laws, fewer and fewer laws in the United
States have drawn race-based, sex-based, or other types of classifications on
their face. However, although facially neutral, laws would be intentionally
administered in a discriminatory manner so as to burden a targeted class of
persons. Thus, for example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins32 the U.S. Supreme
Court was confronted with a facially neutral statute that required laundries
to be located in certain types of buildings absent a waiver.33 In practice,
however, every Chinese applicant was denied a waiver while all but one
non-Chinese applicant was granted a waiver.34 The Court held that the
threshold requirement for making out an equal protection claim is satisfied
when a law, although facially neutral, is administered in a discriminatory
manner.35 In addition, and in the absence of direct proof of discriminatory
administration, one passage in the opinion appeared to suggest that the ex-
treme discriminatory effect of the law, standing alone, sufficed to satisfy
the threshold requirement of an equal protection claim:
[W]hile this consent of the supervisors is withheld from them and from two hundred others
who have also petitioned, all of whom happen to be Chinese subjects, eighty others, not Chi-
nese subjects, are permitted to carry on the same business under similar conditions. The fact
of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is shown, and the conclusion cannot be re-
sisted, that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the peti-
tioners belong, and which, in the eye of the law, is not justified.36
While Yick Wo may have suggested that discriminatory effects, stand-
ing alone, are sufficient, that conclusion was not required for the decision
and therefore arguably left the question open. When directly confronted
31 See id.
32 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
33 Id. at 357.
34 Id. at 374.
35 Id. at 373-74 ("Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to
make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.").
36 Id. at 374.
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with this issue in 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis37
made explicit what it indicated had been foreshadowed by its earlier cas-
es-namely, that, at least as a general rule, discriminatory effects alone do
not suffice to make out an equal protection claim:
[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard
to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it
has a racially disproportionate impact.
Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totali-
ty of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one
race than another .... Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serv-
ing ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious ra-
cial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule
that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only
by the weightiest of considerations.
38
In Davis, Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he
discussed the relevance of extreme discriminatory effects:
[T]he line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright,
and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the Court's opinion might assume. I agree,
of course, that a constitutional issue does not arise every time some disproportionate impact
is shown. On the other hand, when the disproportion is as dramatic as in Gomillion v. Light-
foot, 364 U.S. 339, or Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, it really does not matter whether
the standard is phrased in terms of purpose or effect.
39
Gomillion v. Lightfoot,4° cited by Justice Stevens, had similar facts to Yick
Wo in that the discriminatory effects were quite stark. There, the Alabama
legislature redrew the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee so as to create an
oddly shaped twenty-eight sided figure that had the effect of removing 395
of the 400 African-American voters from the city without removing a single
Caucasian voter.4'
Davis, at least when considered in conjunction with Justice Stevens's
concurrence, appeared to leave open the possibility that extreme discrimina-
tory effects might suffice on their own to make out an equal protection
claim. The theoretical justification for this exception to the general rule is
that extreme discriminatory effects likely cannot be explained on any
ground other than discriminatory intent. Indeed, a year later, in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,42 the Court
37 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
38 Id. at 239, 242 (citation omitted).
39 Id. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring).
40 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
41 See id. at 341.
42 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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explained the ways in which one could prove discriminatory purpose, and
left open the narrow possibility that extreme evidence of discriminatory
effect might be sufficient for an equal protection claim:
Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect
of the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face. The evi-
dentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as
that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to
other evidence.
43
The Village of Arlington Heights Court went on to detail the types of "other
evidence" that normally would be used to prove discriminatory purpose
when a law was facially neutral, including the sequence of events leading
up to the challenged decision; the legislative or administrative history; and
possibly the testimony of individual legislatorsa"
Several years later, in McCleskey v. Kemp,45 the Court acknowledged
that in some instances, evidence of extreme discriminatory effect alone
could suffice as the sole proof of discriminatory purpose. The Court noted
"statistical proof normally must present a 'stark' pattern to be accepted as
the sole proof of discriminatory intent under the Constitution," and cited
Yick Wo and Gomillion as paradigmatic examples.46
However, the narrowness of any potential Yick Wo-Gomillion excep-
tion is emphasized by the Court's unwillingness to apply it in Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.47 At issue in that case was an
equal protection challenge to a state veterans' preference in hiring.4" Be-
cause 98 percent of veterans in the state were men, the hiring preference
had a rather glaringly disparate impact on women.49 Yet the Court held that
this did not suffice to make out a sex-based equal protection claim, even
though state lawmakers were aware of the impact it would have." The
Court held that proving discriminatory purpose requires plaintiffs to show
that lawmakers "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least
in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group."'"
43 Id. at 266 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
44 See id. at 267-68. The Court also made clear that the discriminatory purpose need not be the
sole, dominant, or even primary purpose behind a law or official governmental action; rather, it suffices
that it was a "motivating factor." See id. at 265-66.
45 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
46 Id. at 293.
47 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
48 Id. at 259.
49 Id. at 269-7 1.
50 Id. at 278-79.
51 Id. at 279.
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Collectively, the Court's cases from Yick Wo through Feeney provide
three possible methods of bringing an equal protection challenge against a
facially neutral law. The first method involves proving that the law, alt-
hough facially neutral, is not administered in a way that discriminates
against those of a given race, sex, sexual orientation, or other class, rather
than in an evenhanded manner. The second method involves proving that a
law has a discriminatory effect on a given class, and that there is evidence
that the law was enacted because of that discriminatory effect. The third
method-the possible Yick Wo-Gomillion exception-involves a law whose
discriminatory effects on a given class are so stark that discriminatory pur-
pose can be inferred even in the absence of direct proof.
B. Discriminatory Purpose and Sexual Orientation
Lower courts have frequently entertained the first method of challeng-
ing a facially neutral law that is selectively enforced against sexual minori-
ties. For example, in most states in which sodomy or the solicitation of sod-
omy has been criminalized, the law was truly neutral in that it applied not
just to sodomy engaged in by people of the same sex but also to sodomy
performed by people of opposite sexes. As a result, courts concluded that
such sodomy laws, on their face, do not discriminate against gays and lesbi-
ans and could not be challenged on equal protection grounds, regardless of
the disproportionate effect such laws may have had on gays and lesbians
compared to the rest of the general public.52 Yet such courts acknowledged
that evidence of selective enforcement of such laws would suffice to make
out an equal protection claim. 3 Similarly, courts have recognized that laws
criminalizing public sex are facially neutral, yet the courts have left open
the possibility of challenging them on equal protection grounds when cou-
pled with evidence of selective enforcement against gays and lesbians."
52 See Stewart v. United States, 364 A.2d 1205, 1207 (D.C. 1976) ("The above statute, by its very
terms, proscribes specific conduct and does not single out any particular group of persons. The statute
applies to acts between men, between women, and between a man and a woman. Similarly, § 22-3502
makes no distinction between sodomitic acts committed by homosexuals, heterosexuals, or bisexuals. In
view of its universal applicability, we must conclude that our sodomy statute is neutral on its face."
(citation omitted)); State v. Baxley, 656 So. 2d 973, 978 (La. 1995) ("[T]he statute, on its face, is neu-
tral. It applies equally to all individuals-male, female, heterosexual and homosexual. The statute pun-
ishes conduct-solicitation with the intent to engage in oral sex or anal sex for compensation. The
statute does not single out gay men or lesbians for punishment." (footnote omitted)); Branche v. Com-
monwealth, 489 S.E.2d 692, 696 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) ("Code §§ 18.2-29 and 18.2-361, on their face, are
gender neutral and apply equally to males and females. If either a heterosexual male or female solicited
another to engage in a consensual act of oral sodomy, he or she would be subject to prosecution for
felony criminal solicitation.").
53 See, e.g., Stewart, 364 A.2d at 1208; Branche, 489 S.E.2d at 696;.
54 See, e.g., Gaymon v. Esposito, Civil Action No. 11-4170 (JLL), 2012 WL 1068750, at *11
(D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012); Hope v. City of Long Beach, No. CV 04-4249 DT (RZx), 2005 WL 6009954, at
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These laws are unquestionably facially neutral. It is realistic to think of
them being enforced against heterosexuals in the absence of selective en-
forcement. Thus characterization as facially neutral makes sense.
But in reliance on Davis and its progeny, lower courts confronting
laws whose neutrality seems less apparent have characterized those laws,
when challenged by gays and lesbians, as facially neutral. For example,
laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, denying rights to same-sex couples
(such as adopting children), or punishing consensual same-sex sodomy55
have been challenged on Equal Protection Clause grounds. Defenders of
such laws have contended, and some judges have held, that a threshold re-
quirement for stating an equal protection claim is lacking since these laws
are facially neutral on sexual orientation.
The argument embraced in such holdings is that the laws, on their
face, say nothing whatsoever about the sexual orientation of the individuals
involved. For example, when a couple applies for a marriage license, no
inquiry is made into their sexual orientation. Gay men and lesbians are per-
fectly free to marry, so long as they marry someone of the opposite sex.56
Similarly, laws prohibiting same-sex sodomy say nothing about the sexual
orientation of the individuals involved; they merely prohibit such conduct
when it occurs between two persons of the same sex.57 Likewise, laws pro-
hibiting recognition of same-sex adoption are also facially neutral and
equally prohibit two heterosexual people of the same sex from adopting.5"
*6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2005); see also Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 657-58
(Mass. 2006) (Marshall, C.J, concurring) (upholding the constitutionality of Massachusetts's reverse
evasion statute-whereby the state would not permit non-residents to marry if their home state would
not permit such a marriage-as applied to out-of-state same-sex couples wishing to marry, and noting
that such laws are facially neutral in that they apply to restrictions on heterosexual marriage as well, but
leaving open the possibility that such a law could be challenged if selectively enforced only against
same-sex couples).
55 At least prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision with regard to same-sex sodomy in Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
56 See Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1004 (D. Nev. 2012); In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d 384, 465 (Cal. 2008) (Baxter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of
Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 521 n. I I (Conn. 2008) (Zarella, J., dissenting); Dean v. District of Colum-
bia, 653 A.2d 307, 362-63 (D.C. 1995) (Steadman, A.J., concurring); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 975 (Mass. 2003) (Spina, J., dissenting); Hemandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1,
20 (N.Y. 2006) (Graffeo, J., concurring); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 997 (Wash. 2006)
(Johnson, J., concurring).
57 See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (en banc), rev'd, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
58 See Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1307-08 (W.D. Okla. 2006) ("[T]he
Amendment requires Oklahoma agencies and courts to refuse recognition to one of a child's parents if
that child was adopted in some other state by two persons of the same sex. The Amendment, on its face,
has the same impact whether the adoptive same-sex parents were homosexual or heterosexual; thus,
sexual orientation is not the focus of the statute." (footnote omitted)), afjfd in part, rev'd in part sub
nor. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007); In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675,
710 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) ("[T]he Legislature's manifest purpose in enacting the 1977 amendments to
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In an apparent endorsement of a non-essentialist, more fluid way of
thinking about sexuality which puts traditionally conservative jurists in the
same camp as many queer theorists,59 these judges posit that two people of
the same sex might marry even though they are not gay,6" and that not eve-
ryone who engages in same-sex sexual conduct is gay.6' In this way, these
judges distinguish such laws from the law at issue in Romer, which explicit-
ly provided for differential treatment of those having a "homosexual, lesbi-
an, or bisexual orientation. 62
Exemplary of this reasoning is the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision
in Baehr v. Lewin:63
"Homosexual" and "same-sex" marriages are not synonymous; by the same token, a "hetero-
sexual" same-sex marriage is, in theory, not oxymoronic.... Parties to "a union between a
man and a woman" may or may not be homosexuals. Parties to a same-sex marriage could
theoretically be either homosexuals or heterosexuals. 64
To be sure, many of these judges reason that laws prohibiting same-sex
marriage have a discriminatory effect on gays and lesbians, but citing Feen-
ey, they conclude that such discriminatory effects are not actionable in the
Family Code, section 300, was to exclude same-sex couples from the institution of marriage. Likewise,
the exclusionary intent of California voters who passed Proposition 22 could not be more clear. Ballot
arguments in favor of the initiative raised the specter of same-sex couples moving to this state and
forcing California to recognize marriages they entered elsewhere, even though California law would not
have authorized the marriage. The intent of this measure, as with the Legislature's 1977 Family Code
amendments, was clearly to prohibit gays and lesbians from marrying their same-sex partners." (cita-
tions omitted)).
59 See generally Robin L. West, Law's Nobility, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 385,434-35 (2005).
60 See, e.g., Dean, 653 A.2d at 362-63 (Steadman, A.J., concurring) ("To the extent it is exclusive,
it is exclusive evenly of all same-sex couples, who may, for whatever reason, wish to enter that legal
status.").
61 See, e.g., Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 353 ("On its face, the statute makes no classification on the
basis of sexual orientation; rather, the statute is expressly directed at conduct. While homosexuals may
be disproportionately affected by the statute, we cannot assume homosexual conduct is limited only to
those possessing a homosexual 'orientation.' Persons having a predominately heterosexual inclination
may sometimes engage in homosexual conduct.").
62 See Dean, 653 A.2d at 362 (D.C. 1995) (Steadman, AJ., concurring) ("My initial difficulty
with a postulate of appellants' analysis ... is its treatment of the marriage statute as the equivalent of a
statute expressly addressed to an assertedly suspect class. The marriage statute is simply not the same as,
say, a statute prohibiting the employment of homosexuals. Cf Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335
(Colo. 1994) (holding that Amendment 2, which prohibited the state and municipalities from passing
legislation to protect homosexuals, infringed on plaintiffs' right to vote in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause).").
63 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
64 ld. at 51 n.l 11.
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absence of evidence that the laws were enacted because of-not in spite
of-those effects.65
C. Responding to Claims that Same-Sex Conduct Laws are Facially
Neutral
There are at least three responses to this line of argument. First, one
can accept the characterization of these laws as facially neutral but invoke
the second method of challenging such laws-that they have a discrimina-
tory effect on gays and lesbians and were enacted because of that discrimi-
natory effect. Second, one can invoke the third method of challenging such
a law, accepting the facially neutral characterization but demonstrating that
the discriminatory impact on gays and lesbians is so extreme-akin to Yick
Wo and Gomillion-that courts should deem the threshold requirement for
making out an equal protection claim satisfied. Finally, one can argue that
these judges are making a distinction without a difference, that for all prac-
tical purposes to draw distinctions on the basis of a desire to enter into a
same-sex marriage or to engage in same-sex conduct is tantamount to or
merely a proxy for sexual orientation, and thus it is unsound to treat these
laws as facially neutral.
Consider the first response to this line of argument. Under this ap-
proach, one argues that the laws, although facially neutral, were enacted
because of their discriminatory impact on gays and lesbians. Litigants em-
ploying this argument will have far greater success challenging one of the
many recently enacted state laws and constitutional amendments prohibit-
ing same-sex marriage, because nearly all of those laws and amendments
were in reaction to court decisions granting same-sex couples the right to
marry.
Litigants will be much less successful with this approach if they chal-
lenge marriage laws written long ago, before lawmakers even conceived of
gays and lesbians as a distinct class of persons. In this regard, a statement
by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas,66 in
which the Court explained how its earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick7
had erred in finding a long-standing history of laws directed against homo-
sexuality, is instructive:
At the outset it should be noted that there is no longstanding history in this country of laws
directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter .... The English prohibition was under-
stood to include relations between men and women as well as relations between men and
65 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 465 (Cal. 2008) (Baxter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 521-23 (Conn. 2008) (Zarella, J.,
dissenting).
66 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
67 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
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men .... The absence of legal prohibitions focusing on homosexual conduct may be ex-
plained in part by noting that according to some scholars the concept of the homosexual as a
distinct category of person did not emerge until the late 19th century. Thus early American
sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit
nonprocreative sexual activity more generally.
... American laws targeting same-sex couples did not develop until the last third of the
20th century....
It was not until the 1970's that any State singled out same-sex relations for criminal
prosecution.
68
For example, most of what might be described as the second wave of same-
sex marriage legal challenges-those brought in the late 1990s and in the
2000s 6 9 -were brought in states such as Massachusetts, Maryland, New
York, and Vermont.7" None of those states had enacted either defense-of-
marriage acts or constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage.
Because the courts in those states might interpret ambiguously worded mar-
riage statutes to permit same-sex marriage, the opportunities for successful-
ly challenging laws banning same-sex marriage were greatest in those
states. Also, the absence of constitutional amendments meant that there
were no obstacles to declaring the laws unconstitutional on state constitu-
tional grounds. Yet these advantages came with a disadvantage if such laws
are treated as facially neutral on sexual orientation: to the extent these laws
were written long before legislators conceived of gays and lesbians as a
distinct class of persons, evidence of discriminatory intent was lacking.
This lack of evidence of intent led some judges in those states to conclude
that the threshold for bringing an equal protection claim had not been satis-
fied.7'
In contrast, it has been much easier to uncover record evidence that
same-sex marriage laws were designed to target gays and lesbians during
what may be described as the third wave of same-sex marriage challenges."
68 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568, 570 (citations omitted).
69 The first wave of same-sex marriage legal challenges-discussed in greater detail in Part II-
began in the early 1970s.
70 See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 581 (Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d
1, 5 (N.Y. 2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867-68 (Vt. 1999).
71 See, e.g., Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 644 (Mass. 2006) (Spina, J.,
concurring) ("When §§ II and 12 were enacted in 1913, same-sex marriage was not visible on the
horizon of our jurisprudence, suggesting that the Legislature did not, in fact, promulgate these statutes
for the express purpose of discriminating against same-sex couples."); Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 20
(Graffeo, J., concurring) ("Plaintiffs concede that the Domestic Relations Law was not enacted with an
invidiously discriminatory intent-the Legislature did not craft the marriage laws for the purpose of
disadvantaging gays and lesbians.").
72 See Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1310-11 (W.D. Okla. 2006) ("Here, the
Amendment was clearly targeted at preventing recognition of homosexual parents. Defendants' briefs
are replete with arguments demonstrating the Amendment targets homosexuals, and Defendants admit
as undisputed Plaintiffs' fact no. 13 which states the Amendment was intended to 'protect Oklahoma
children from being targeted for adoption by gay couples across the nation and to ensure that children
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Examples include cases brought in the 2000s in states like California or
Oklahoma that had enacted statutes and/or constitutional amendments pro-
hibiting same-sex marriage or recognition of same-sex adoption.73 Most
states where same-sex marriage is no longer permitted fall into this catego-
ry, and characterizing these laws as facially neutral should no longer pose
an obstacle to bringing an equal protection challenge in such states.
With regard to the second response to arguments of facial neutrality,
as indicated above the Court's decisions appear to have left open the possi-
bility of bringing an equal protection challenge to an otherwise facially
neutral law based on extreme evidence of discriminatory effect alone.
Working from cases such as Yick Wo and Gomillion, the argument is that
extreme discriminatory effects cannot be explained by anything other than
discriminatory intent.74 Or, to quote Justice Stevens concurring in Davis,
"when the disproportion is as dramatic as in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339, or Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, it really does not matter
whether the standard is phrased in terms of purpose or effect. 7 5 Same-sex
marriage, adoption, and benefits bans, however charitably framed and de-
spite their theoretical application to heterosexuals, seem quite suitable for
invoking the Yick Wo-Gomillion exception. However, the challenge for gay
and lesbian plaintiffs in invoking the exception is the uncertainty over
whether or not the exception truly exists, for the Court seems to have virtu-
ally limited those cases to their facts, typically invoking them merely as a
foil to contrast with the more modest discriminatory effects in post-Davis
cases.7 6 However, if the exception does exist, no other modem-day equal
protection challenge presents as "stark" a discriminatory effect, nor one that
is more akin to the effects present in Yick Wo and Gomillion, as is seen in
cases challenging laws prohibiting same-sex marriage and other same-sex
conduct.
The third response is to challenge what can perhaps best be described
as the "sophistry"7 7 behind the contention that sexual orientation and same-
are raised in traditional family environments."'), afd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Finstuen v.
Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
73 Id. at 1311.
74 See Plaintiff-Appellees' Response Brief at 19, Collins v. Diaz, 656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2011)
(No. 10-16797) ("[l]ntentional discrimination 'may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one [group] than another."'
(alteration in original) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 373 (1886))); Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr. in Support of Parties
Challenging the Marriage Exclusion at 53, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No.
S 147999) ("Because 'the impact' of the same-sex marriage exclusion 'falls virtually exclusively on gay
men and lesbians,' this case is not materially different from Yick Wo." (citation omitted)).
75 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 254 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
76 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 & n.12 (1987); Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
77 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,441 (Cal. 2008).
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sex conduct-such as the desire to marry or engage in sexual activity with
someone of the same sex-are distinguishable. Ironically enough, this sta-
tus-conduct divergence was actually a litigation strategy developed by ad-
vocates of gay rights. The strategy was born out of necessity, as a way of
removing Bowers as an obstacle to challenging other types of laws discrim-
inating against gays and lesbians. In response to a substantive due process
challenge, Bowers upheld the constitutionality of Georgia's sodomy law as
applied to sodomy between two people of the same-sex.78 Although not
decided on equal protection grounds, many lower courts viewed the deci-
sion as effectively foreclosing such a claim.79 The solution was to create a
doctrinal distinction between homosexual conduct and homosexual status."
By characterizing Bowers as a conduct case, gay rights advocates were able
to contend that laws discriminating against people merely because they are
gay are distinguishable, and thus subject to constitutional challenge, Bowers
notwithstanding.' Exemplary of this line of reasoning is the following ex-
cerpt from Judge Norris's concurring opinion in Watkins v. United States
Army, 82 involving a challenge to the military's then-existing ban on service
by gays and lesbians:
[W]hile Hardwick does indeed hold that the due process clause provides no substantive pri-
vacy protection for acts of private homosexual sodomy, nothing in Hardwick suggests that
the state may penalize gays merely for their sexual orientation. In other words, the class of
persons involved in Hardwick-those who engage in homosexual sodomy-is not congruous
with the class of persons targeted by the Army's regulations-those with a homosexual ori-
entation. Hardwick was a "conduct" case; Watkins' is an "orientation" case.
83
78 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
79 See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Although the Court
analyzed the constitutionality of the statute on a due process rather than an equal protection basis,
Hardwick nevertheless impacts on the scrutiny aspects under an equal protection analysis. The majority
held that the Constitution confers no fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. If
homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect
or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes. The
Constitution, in light of Hardwick, cannot otherwise be rationally applied, lest an unjustified and inde-
fensible inconsistency result." (footnote omitted)); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
("If the Court was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it
is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the class is invid-
ious. After all, there can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct
that defines the class criminal.").
80 See Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV.
1551, 1617 (1993).
81 See id; Jonathan Pickhardt, Choose or Lose: Embracing Theories of Choice in Gay Rights
Litigation Strategies, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 931 (1998).
82 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
83 Id. at 716-17 (Norris, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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With Bowers overruled by Lawrence and thus the need for status-
conduct divergence eliminated as a strategic tool for advancing gay rights,
advocates for same-sex marriage have contended, and courts have begun to
accept, that status and conduct are indistinguishable in this context. Repre-
sentative of this perspective is the California Supreme Court's decision in
In re Marriage Cases:4
By limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, the marriage statutes, realistically viewed, op-
erate clearly and directly to impose different treatment on gay individuals because of their
sexual orientation. By definition, gay individuals are persons who are sexually attracted to
persons of the same sex and thus, if inclined to enter into a marriage relationship, would
choose to marry a person of their own sex or gender. A statute that limits marriage to a union
of persons of opposite sexes, thereby placing marriage outside the reach of couples of the
same sex, unquestionably imposes different treatment on the basis of sexual orientation. In
our view, it is sophistic to suggest that this conclusion is avoidable by reason of the circum-
stance that the marriage statutes permit a gay man or a lesbian to marry someone of the op-
posite sex, because making such a choice would require the negation of the person's sexual
orientation."
The In re Marriage Cases majority reinforced its conclusion by quoting an
amicus brief by a group of mental health organizations explaining that sex-
ual orientation is best thought of in relational rather than individual terms:
Sexual orientation is commonly discussed as a characteristic of the individual, like biological
sex, gender identity, or age. This perspective is incomplete because sexual orientation is al-
ways defined in relational terms and necessarily involves relationships with other individu-
als. Sexual acts and romantic attractions are categorized as homosexual or heterosexual ac-
cording to the biological sex of the individuals involved in them, relative to each other. In-
deed, it is by acting-or desiring to act-with another person that individuals express their
heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality .... Consequently, sexual orientation is not
merely a personal characteristic that can be defined in isolation. Rather, one's sexual orienta-
tion defines the universe of persons with whom one is likely to find the satisfying and ful-
filling relationships that, for many individuals, comprise an essential component of personal
identi ty.
86
The artificial divide between status and conduct in the context of
same-sex marriage becomes even more apparent if one seeks to apply it to
interracial marriage. One might characterize those who fall in love and seek
84 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
85 Id. at 440-41 (footnote omitted); accord Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431
n.24 (Conn. 2008); Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009); see also Golinski v. U.S.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 982 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (noting that plaintiff's "desire to
marry another woman arises only because she is a lesbian"); Hemandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 11
(N.Y. 2006) ("However, the legislation does confer advantages on the basis of sexual preference. Those
who prefer relationships with people of the opposite sex and those who prefer relationships with people
of the same sex are not treated alike, since only opposite-sex relationships may gain the status and
benefits associated with marriage.").
86 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 441 n.59 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to marry someone of another race as "transracially oriented."87 Thus, the
argument would go, bans on interracial marriage do not discriminate
against the transracially oriented, because such individuals remain free to
marry so long as they marry someone of the same race. Such laws, one
could contend, are not about the "status" of being transracially oriented, but
rather the "conduct" of seeking to marry someone of the same race.
For all of these reasons, the contention that laws prohibiting same-sex
marriage or same-sex sodomy do not discriminate against gays and lesbians
and are therefore facially neutral for equal protection purposes seems, in the
words of one high court, "to blink at reality.""8 On the contrary, it would
seem obvious to most neutral observers that a law banning same-sex mar-
riage or criminalizing same-sex sodomy is directed at gays and lesbians as a
class.
D. The Supreme Court Blinks at Reality
Any argument that such laws are facially neutral might seem akin to
making the argument that a law targeting pregnancy is in no way necessari-
ly targeted at women as a class; or that a law targeting membership in an
Indian tribe is in no way necessarily targeted at those who are racially or
ethnically Native American. There is a problem with those analogies, how-
ever. In a pair of cases decided on the same day that foreshadowed the
Court's decision in Washington v. Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court held that,
for equal protection purposes, such laws do not constitute sex or race dis-
crimination, respectively.
1. Geduldig v. Aiello and the Pregnant-Nonpregnant Person
Distinction
The first case, Geduldig v. Aiello, 9 drew what can best be described as
a razor-thin line between pregnancy and sex discrimination for equal pro-
tection purposes. At issue in that case was the constitutionality of a disabil-
ity insurance system administered by California.9° Under California law,
participation in the program was mandatory for all private sector employees
in the state unless covered by an approved private plan." The plan excluded
all pregnancy-related disability claims, provoking an equal protection chal-
87 Cf id. at 435 (noting that it would be unconstitutional to prohibit interracial marriage but permit
interracial couples to instead enter into an alternative scheme entitled a "transracial union").
88 Kerrigan, 957 A.2dat431 n.24.
89 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
90 Id. at 486.
91 Id. at487.
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lenge that the exclusion constituted discrimination on the basis of sex.9 2
After concluding that the state's interest in excluding such claims had been
to keep premiums low by excluding particularly expensive coverage risks,93
the Court explained that there was no sex discrimination warranting height-
ened scrutiny:
The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because
of gender but merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy--from the list of compen-
sable disabilities. While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow
that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification....
Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteris-
tics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to
effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers
are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation
such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition.
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this in-
surance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides poten-
tial recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first
group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actu-
arial benefits of the program thus accrue to members of both sexes."4
In addition to finding that there was no facial sex discrimination, the Court
also concluded that there was no discriminatory intent behind the law.95
One might also view Geduldig as implicitly rejecting invocation of the
Yick Wo-Gomillion exception, on the theory that pregnancy discrimination
negatively impacts 100 percent of women, which is perhaps even starker
than the pattern present in those two cases.96 Yet that might be reading too
much into Geduldig. After all, in Yick Wo, virtually all people of Chinese
descent were negatively impacted by the administrative scheme, while vir-
tually all people of non-Chinese descent benefited. Thus, there were no
Chinese persons on the "winning" side of the ledger. In contrast, many non-
pregnant women were on the winning side of the ledger in Geduldig to the
extent they benefited from the lower premiums, a point emphasized by the
Geduldig Court. Indeed, the Court's subsequent decision in Feeney seems
to make much the same point with the veterans' preference at issue there,
noting the presence of many men on the losing side of the ledger and at
least some women on the winning side.97
92 Id. at 489-90.
9' Id. at 492-96.
94 Id. at 496 n.20; see also id. at 496-97 ("There is no risk from which men are protected and
women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not.")
95 Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496.
96 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., America's Statutory "constitution," 41 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1, 39
n. 175 (2007) (noting the inconsistency between Geduldig and Yick Wo).
97 See Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 275 (1979) ("Although few women benefit from the
preference, the nonveteran class is not substantially all female. To the contrary, significant numbers of
nonveterans are men, and all nonveterans-male as well as female-are placed at a disadvantage. Too
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Two years after deciding Geduldig, and in the same year Washington
v. Davis was decided, the Court reaffirmed its Geduldig holding and ex-
tended it to encompass statutory claims of sex discrimination under Title
VII. 9t Two years later, in 1978, Congress overruled that decision by enact-
ing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"), which amended the defimi-
tion of the phrases "because of sex" and "on the basis of sex" as used in
Title VII to include "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions." 99 However, the Court's equal protection hold-
ing in Geduldig-at least for now-remains good law.
2. Morton v. Mancari and the Racial-Political Indian Distinction
In Morton v. Mancari,'" issued on the same day as Geduldig, the same
majority of Justices that drew a distinction between laws targeting pregnan-
cy and those targeting sex also drew a distinction between laws targeting
the ethnic or racial status of being an Indian and those targeting the politi-
cal status of membership in a federally recognized tribe. At issue in the case
was an equal protection challenge to a federal statute and accompanying
regulations that gave a hiring preference to "Indians."' 0 ' The Court ex-
plained that only rational basis scrutiny applied because only the political
status of being an Indian, not the ethnic or racial status of being one, was at
play in the statutory and regulatory scheme:
Contrary to the characterization made by appellees, this preference does not constitute "racial
discrimination." Indeed, it is not even a "racial" preference. Rather, it is an employment cri-
terion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the
BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups. It is directed to participation by
the governed in the governing agency. The preference is similar in kind to the constitutional
requirement that a United States Senator, when elected, be "an Inhabitant of that State for
which he shall be chosen," Art. I, § 3, cl. 3, or that a member of a city council reside within
the city governed by the council. Congress has sought only to enable the BIA to draw more
heavily from among the constituent group in staffing its projects, all of which, either directly
or indirectly, affect the lives of tribal Indians. The preference, as applied, is granted to Indi-
ans not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities
whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion.1 2
In a footnote, the Court elaborated on the distinction:
many men are affected by ch. 31, § 23, to permit the inference that the statute is but a pretext for prefer-
ring men over women."); accord id at 281 (Stevens, J., concurring).
98 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133-40 (1976).
99 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Equal Emp't
Opportunity Comm'n, 462 U.S. 669, 676-80 (1983).
100 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
'01 Id. at 537.
102 Id. at 553-54 (footnote omitted).
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The preference is not directed towards a "racial" group consisting of "Indians"; instead, it
applies only to members of "federally recognized" tribes. This operates to exclude many in-
dividuals who are racially to be classified as "Indians." In this sense, the preference is politi-
cal rather than racial in nature.'0 3
E. Criticism and a Narrowing of Geduldig and Mancari
Both the Geduldig and Mancari decisions are open to, and have been
the subject of, intense and continuing criticism for what many view as the
Court making artificial distinctions."°4 In both cases, although the Court can
point to a non-suspect characteristic-pregnancy in Geduldig and tribal
membership in Mancari-the group impacted is necessarily a subset of a
suspect class. °5 Thus, while it is true that not all women get pregnant, only
women can get pregnant, and thus the only people harmed by discrimina-
tion against those who are pregnant are women. Similarly, under the legal
scheme at issue in Mancari, those who were politically Indian were a subset
of those who are racially or ethnically Indian, since the regulations enacted
to carry out the statutory preference for "Indians" provided that the prefer-
ence was available only for those who were both "one-fourth or more de-
gree Indian blood and ... a member of a Federally-recognized tribe."'0 6 The
criticisms of the reasoning pursued by the Court in Geduldig and Mancari
are perhaps best summed up by a federal district court responding to similar
reasoning pre-Geduldig:
[I]t might appear to the lay mind that we are treading on the brink of a precipice of absurdity.
Perhaps the admonition of Professor Thomas Reed Powell to his law students is apt; "If you
can think of something which is inextricably related to some other thing and not think of the
other thing, you have a legal mind.'1
0 7
Despite these sound criticisms, Geduldig and Mancari remain good
law. Both cases present potentially significant obstacles to equal protection
arguments that laws discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation whenev-
103 Id. at 553 n.24.
104 See L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 702, 725 (2001).
105 See generally id. at 725 n. 152; Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 955, 983-84 (1984); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 285 (1984); David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759, 800-03 (1991).
106 See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24. The statute itself provides that:
The Secretary of the Interior is directed to establish standards of health, age, character, expe-
rience, knowledge, and ability for Indians who may be appointed, without regard to civil-
service laws, to the various positions maintained, now or hereafter, by the Indian Office, in
the administration of functions or services affecting any Indian tribe. Such qualified Indians
shall hereafter have the preference to appointment to vacancies in any such positions.
Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 472 (2006).
107 Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1157 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
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er they prohibit same-sex marriage, same-sex adoption, same-sex sexual
activity, or the receipt of benefits for same-sex partners. To see how, start
by accepting the disputed assertion that only gays and lesbians seek same-
sex marriage, seek to adopt a child jointly with someone of the same sex, or
seek benefits for a partner of the same-sex. Then assume that discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation is subject to heightened scrutiny-itself
an as yet undecided equal protection issue. Under Geduldig and Mancari,
the fact that gays and lesbians are merely a subset of the class of people
who could seek to engage in the conduct at issue might still immunize a
statute from being deemed discriminatory on the basis of sexual orientation.
After all, just as some women in Geduldig chose not to get pregnant, and
just as in Mancari some people who are racially or ethnically Indian are not
or choose not to be members of a Federally-recognized tribe, so too some
gays and lesbians could choose not to marry, adopt children, engage in
same-sex sexual activity, or seek benefits for a same-sex partner.
Returning to comparisons with interracial marriage, however, and tak-
en to its logical extreme, this line of reasoning would suggest that Loving v.
Virginia"'8 should not have been treated as a case about race. True, the law
impacted some racial minorities-those who chose to marry outside of their
race-but this was merely a subset of the larger group of racial minorities,
many of whom chose not to marry outside of their race (the law in Loving
also impacted some majority whites who wished to marry outside of their
race, a point whose relevance is taken up in Part II of this Article). As one
commentator has put it:
Analogous categories include left-handed African-Americans, Asian-American citizens of
California, and Latino government employees. True, the category does not include all mem-
bers of a particular racial group, but then neither did the categories "black schoolchildren" in
Brown, or "Japanese-American residents of the West Coast" in Korematsu v. United States,
or "nonminority applicants to medical school" in Bakke. In all of these, the government had
singled out individuals because of their race; it is irrelevant that other members of their race
were not so singled out. If the government could discriminate against any given suspect
group simply by subdividing the group with the aid of nonsuspect characteristics, the protec-
tion of the equal protection clause would quickly come to have little meaning. It cannot be,
then, that the simple addition of a nonsuspect trait to a suspect one yields a nonsuspect
class.'0 9
Indeed, it is perhaps because of these logical inconsistencies that, outside of
Mancari, "the Court has never applied in any other situation Geduldig's
suggestion that a suspect classification could be rendered nonsuspect by the
addition of a separate, nonsuspect criterion."" 0
108 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
109 See Williams, supra note 105, at 807 (footnotes omitted).
110 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of Native
Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537, 571 n.151 (1996).
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To date, the Court has not overruled either case, although four Justices
recently signaled that they would vote to overrule what they described as
Geduldig's "Alice-in-Wonderland view of pregnancy as a sex-neutral phe-
nomenon."''. Moreover, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have
limited the potential reach of Mancari by applying strict scrutiny to laws
that draw distinctions based purely on one's racial or ethnic Indian status,
standing alone. '2 At the very least, the Court's more recent cases suggest
that the Court would be unlikely to extend Geduldig or Mancari beyond
their facts to encompass other things that can perhaps best be characterized
as proxies for specific classes of persons." 3
Before taking a closer look at those more recent cases, it is worth con-
sidering a hypothetical law that does not facially discriminate against
someone for being "male" or "female." Rather, it draws distinctions based
on whether a person has ovaries or testicles, or the presence or absence of a
Y chromosome. Would that no longer be sex discrimination because the
law, on its face, does not refer to sex? To some extent, this raises the ques-
tion, what is sex?
This extreme example is distinguishable from the law at issue in
Geduldig, in that becoming pregnant does not define what it means to be a
woman. There are, of course, many people who are and remain women
despite the fact that they never become pregnant. On the other hand, the
multi-faceted definition 4 of what it means to be a woman includes such
factors as the presence of a Y chromosome and the presence of ovaries, thus
making the hypothetical statute tantamount to facial sex discrimination.
What, then, about a law that discriminated not based on actual preg-
nancy, but rather on the ability or capacity to become pregnant, or to im-
pregnate someone else? In the years immediately following Geduldig, one
lower court distinguished capacity to become pregnant from pregnancy
itself:
111 See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1344-47 & n.6 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
112 See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 518-22 (2000) (state violated Fifteenth Amendment
by limiting class of voters for state trust to Native Hawaiians); Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271,
1279 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Govemment discrimination against Indians based on race or national origin and
not on membership or non-membership in tribal groups can be race discrimination subject to strict
scrutiny."); In re A.W., 741 N.w.2d 793, 807-10 (Iowa 2007) ("'Indian child' is a racial classification
[and] .. .[c]lassifications based on race are 'presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an
extraordinary justification."'); see generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
§ 14.03(2)(b) at 948-64 (2012 ed.) (discussing the tensions between political and racial aspects of the
federal-tribal relationship).
113 See infra notes 115-130 and accompanying text.
114 Other factors include: internal morphologic sex (seminal vesicles/prostate versus vagi-
na/uterus/fallopian tubes), external morphologic sex (genitalia), hormonal sex (predominance of andro-
gens or estrogens), phenotypic sex (secondary sex characteristics, such as facial hair or breasts), and
personal sexual identity. See In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 73 (Md. 2003).
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"[T]he ability to become pregnant" is simply not the classification in question. There is no
benefit which is paid or denied to persons having or not having that ability. If there were
such a distinction, if for example Narragansett had a different salary schedule for those who
"had the capacity to become pregnant", it would obviously be equivalent to sex discrimina-
tion. But that is not the situation before us. The classification is not "those with the capacity
to become pregnant"; it is "those who are pregnant." While the former defines a class which
includes all women and excludes all men, and so is truly sex-based, the latter does not." 5
Similarly, in 1991 the U.S. Supreme Court decided International Un-
ion, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of
America v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,"6 a Title VII challenge to an employer's
policy of not hiring women capable of becoming pregnant. The stated rea-
son for the policy was the potential risk to any child the employee might
carry due to lead exposure." 7 In holding that the policy violated Title VII,
the Court made clear that the law was not facially sex neutral even without
taking into account the amendments made by the PDA, and found that the
Act only strengthened its conclusion:
The bias in Johnson Controls' policy is obvious. Fertile men, but not fertile women, are giv-
en a choice as to whether they wish to risk their reproductive health for a particular job....
Respondent's fetal-protection policy explicitly discriminates against women on the basis of
their sex. The policy excludes women with childbearing capacity from lead-exposed jobs and
so creates a facial classification based on gender....
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals assumed, as did the two appellate courts that al-
ready had confronted the issue, that sex-specific fetal-protection policies do not involve faci-
al discrimination. These courts analyzed the policies as though they were facially neutral,
and had only a discriminatory effect upon the employment opportunities of women....
First, Johnson Controls' policy classifies on the basis of gender and childbearing capac-
ity, rather than fertility alone. Respondent does not seek to protect the unconceived children
of all its employees. Despite evidence in the record about the debilitating effect of lead expo-
sure on the male reproductive system, Johnson Controls is concerned only with the harms
that may befall the unborn offspring of its female employees.... Johnson Controls' policy is
facially discriminatory because it requires only a female employee to produce proof that she
is not capable of reproducing.
Our conclusion is bolstered by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) .... In its use
of the words "capable of bearing children" in the 1982 policy statement as the criterion for
exclusion, Johnson Controls explicitly classifies on the basis of potential for pregnancy. Un-
der the PDA, such a classification must be regarded, for Title VII purposes, in the same light
as explicit sex discrimination. Respondent has chosen to treat all its female employees as po-
tentially pregnant; that choice evinces discrimination on the basis of sex."'
Although Johnson Controls was decided on statutory and not equal protec-
tion grounds, the Court's decisions regarding sex discrimination under Title
VII and the Equal Protection Clause sometimes cross-cite one another, as in
115 Narragansett Elec. Co. v. R.I. Comm'n for Human Rights, 374 A.2d 1022, 1025 (R.I. 1977).
116 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
117 Id. at 191-92.
118 Id. at 197-99 (citations omitted); see also Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S.
263, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Johnson Controls, I had thought, signaled the Court's recog-
nition that classifications based on ability to become pregnant are necessarily discriminatory.").
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the Court's 1976 decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,"9 the case
extending Geduldig's reasoning to Title VII.' 21 Johnson Controls seems to
suggest that a law targeting a trait that one can characterize as going to the
essence of being male or female, such as capacity to get pregnant, would be
treated as sex discrimination.
Dicta in two other cases decided by the Supreme Court also suggest
the limited reach of the Geduldig-Mancari doctrine. First, in Bray v. Alex-
andria Women's Health Clinic, 21 the Court acknowledged that "[s]ome
activities may be such an irrational object of disfavor that, if they are tar-
geted, and if they also happen to be engaged in exclusively or predominant-
ly by a particular class of people, an intent to disfavor that class can readily
be presumed."'' 22 As an example, the Court stated that, for equal protection
purposes, "[a] tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews."' 123
Second, in Hernandez v. New York,'24 the Supreme Court upheld as
race-neutral a prosecutor's decision to exercise peremptory challenges to
strike two prospective Latino jurors. The prosecutor contended that he
struck the jurors not because they were Latino but because they spoke
Spanish and did not indicate to the prosecutor's satisfaction that they would
be able to defer to the court interpreter's translation of Spanish testimony
into English.'25 The Court plurality rejected an argument that this constitut-
ed ethnicity discrimination, noting that the record demonstrated that the
jurors were struck neither because they were Latino nor for their Spanish-
language ability, and in turn accepted the prosecutor's justification.'26 How-
ever, the plurality left open the possibility that peremptory strikes made
solely on the basis of a jurors' Spanish-language ability might constitute a
proxy for race discrimination:
In holding that a race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge means a reason other than
race, we do not resolve the more difficult question of the breadth with which the concept of
race should be defined for equal protection purposes. We would face a quite different case if
the prosecutor had justified his peremptory challenges with the explanation that he did not
want Spanish-speaking jurors. It may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some commu-
nities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a surro-
gate for race under an equal protection analysis. And, as we make clear, a policy of striking
all who speak a given language, without regard to the particular circumstances of the trial or
119 429 U.S. 125, 133-34 (1976).
120 See id. at 133-34.
121 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
122 Id. at 270.
123 id.
124 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (plurality opinion).
125 Id. at 356-57.
126 Id. at 360.
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the individual responses of the jurors, may be found by the trial judge to be a pretext for ra-
cial discrimination. But that case is not before us. 1
27
This statement by the plurality prompted Justice O'Connor, joined by Jus-
tice Scalia, to pen a separate concurring opinion expressing the view that
the plurality was blurring the line in Davis between discriminatory intent
and discriminatory effect, and suggesting that the Court was softening the
rigidity of that distinction.121 Indeed, several lower courts have subsequently
held that Hernandez can be interpreted to mean that discrimination based
on language can be treated as a proxy for intentional race discrimination in
an equal protection challenge,'29 or at the very least, that it remains an open
question. 3°
F. Applying Johnson Controls, Bray, and Hernandez to Same-Sex
Conduct Laws
Together, Johnson Controls, Bray, and Hernandez provide strong sup-
port for the conclusion that laws targeting same-sex marriage, adoption, and
the like should be treated as sexual orientation discrimination for equal pro-
tection purposes. First, Johnson Controls recognized that a law that does
not directly target a class, but instead targets a trait that goes to the essence
of what it means to be a member of that class, is to be treated as facially
discriminatory.' 3 ' For its part, Hernandez recognizes much the same point
with regard to ethnic minorities, indicating that targeting someone based on
their proficiency in a given language may be treated as tantamount to facial
discrimination on the basis of race.'32 Finally, Bray holds that "[s]ome ac-
tivities may be such an irrational object of disfavor that, if they are targeted,
and if they also happen to be engaged in exclusively or predominantly by a
particular class of people, an intent to disfavor that class can readily be pre-
sumed," and states as an example that "[a] tax on wearing yarmulkes is a
tax on Jews."' 33
Consider, then, a law that prohibits same-sex marriage, or same-sex
sexual activity. Under Bray, could one not classify such activities as "such
127 Id. at 371-72 (citations omitted).
128 Id. at 372-73, 375 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129 See In re Rodriguez, 487 F.3d 1001, 1009 (6th Cir. 2007); Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484,
509 & n.26 (1 th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275
(2001); People v. Gonzales, 165 Cal. Rptr. 4th 620, 628-31 (Ct. App. 2008); Despio v. State, 895 So. 2d
1124, 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
130 See Kikumura v. Turner, 28 F.3d 592, 599-600 (7th Cir. 1994); Rodriguez-Ramirez v. Helder,
No. 06-5062, 2007 WL 2752362, at *9 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 20, 2007).
131 See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
133 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993).
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an irrational object of disfavor" that "happen to be engaged in exclusively
or predominantly by a particular class of people," namely gays and lesbi-
ans, such that "an intent to disfavor that class can readily be presumed"?'34
Similarly, under Johnson Controls and Hernandez, could one not contend
that the desire or propensity to engage in same-sex sexual activity or to
enter into a same-sex marriage goes to the essence of what it means to be
gay or lesbian?
To be sure, sexual orientation is complex and multifaceted, and the de-
sire to engage in these activities may not alone go to the essence of what it
means to be gay or lesbian. Rather, sexual orientation is often defined as
some combination of desire, behavior, and self-identification.'35 Yet, as
indicated above, sex is likewise multifaceted, being about much more than
merely the capacity to become pregnant. And of course, ethnicity is about
much more than language proficiency.'36 Yet both Johnson Controls and
Hernandez together suggest that something can be viewed as targeting a
multifaceted class even if it targets only one definitional facet of that class.
Accordingly, without even considering the Court's more recent decisions in
cases involving sexual orientation which are examined in Part V, there is
strong support for treating laws targeting "same sex" conduct as tantamount
to sexual orientation discrimination for equal protection purposes.
II. SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE CHARYBDIS OF THE EQUAL
APPLICATION THEORY
In Pace v. Alabama,'37 the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed what would
later be referred to as the "equal application" theory.'38 At issue in Pace was
the constitutionality of a statutory scheme whereby interracial fornication
and adultery were punished more severely than fornication and adultery
between people of the same race. In Pace, the Court reasoned that such a
statutory scheme did not actually discriminate at all on the basis of race:
The defect in the argument of counsel consists in his assumption that any discrimination is
made by the laws of Alabama .... The one prescribes, generally, a punishment for an of-
134 id.
135 See generally EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY:
SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 283 (I 994).
136 See Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 869-70 & n.16 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that language is not
equal to ethnicity, because it is "only one of many components of ethnicity."); Fernando J. Gutierrez,
Gay and Lesbian: An Ethnic Identity Deserving Equal Protection, 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 195, 215 (1994)
(identifying numerous facets of ethnicity, including traditions, real or imagined genetic differences,
territoriality, economic basis, religion, aesthetic cultural patterns, language, a sense of community, and
group allegiance).
137 106 U.S. 583 (1883), overruled in part by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
138 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967); McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 191.
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fense committed between persons of different sexes; the other prescribes a punishment for an
offense which can only be committed where the two sexes are of different races. There is in
neither section any discrimination against either race .... Whatever discrimination is made in
the punishment prescribed in the two sections is directed against the offense designated and
not against the person of any particular color or race. The punishment of each offending per-
son, whether white or black, is the same.
139
Given Pace, the Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson4° thirteen
years later-which upheld a Louisiana law requiring white and "colored"
persons to ride in separate train cars-is unsurprising. Plessy formally ush-
ered in the era of "separate but equal," which was relied upon to justify
segregation in all aspects of public life until 1954, when the U.S. Supreme
Court held in Brown v. Board of Education'4' that segregated schools vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause, concluding that "in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."'42
Two post-Brown decisions, both involving laws containing race-based
classifications, addressed the continued vitality of Pace's "equal applica-
tion" theory. The first case, McLaughlin v. Florida,143 involved a Florida
law similar to that at issue in Pace itself. The Florida law criminalized co-
habitation by unmarried persons, but only if one was "white" and the other
"negro" (a separate state law prohibited interracial marriage, but no chal-
lenge to that law was raised in the case).'" The Florida Supreme Court re-
lied on Pace and upheld an equal protection challenge to the law. "' In re-
versing and declaring the Florida law unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme
Court wrote:
In this situation, Pace v. Alabama is relied upon as controlling authority. In our view, how-
ever, Pace represents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause which has not withstood
analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court....
Judicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause, therefore, does not end with a
showing of equal application among the members of the class defined by the legislation. The
courts must reach and determine the question whether the classifications drawn in a statute
are reasonable in light of its purpose-in this case, whether there is an arbitrary or invidious
discrimination between those classes covered by Florida's cohabitation law and those ex-
cluded. That question is what Pace ignored and what must be faced here.
46
McLaughlin paved the way for the Court's decision three years later in
Loving v. Virginia, declaring Virginia's law criminalizing interracial mar-
139 Pace, 106 U.S. at 585.
140 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
141 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
142 Id. at 495.
143 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
144 Id. at 184.
145 See McLaughlin v. State, 153 So. 2d 1, 2-3 (Fla. 1963), rev'd, 379 U.S. 184.
146 McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 188, 191 (citation omitted).
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riage unconstitutional. In Loving, the State of Virginia invoked Pace and
the Court again rejected its application:
[T]he State argues that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause ... is only that state penal
laws containing an interracial element as part of the definition of the offense must apply
equally to whites and Negroes in the sense that members of each race are punished to the
same degree. Thus, the State contends that, because its miscegenation statutes punish equally
both the white and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite
their reliance on racial classifications do not constitute an invidious discrimination based up-
on race....
The State finds support for its "equal application" theory in the decision of the Court in
Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883).... However, as recently as the 1964 Term, in reject-
ing the reasoning of that case, we stated "Pace represents a limited view of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court."
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. at 188....
There can be no question but that Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely upon dis-
tinctions drawn according to race. The statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct if en-
gaged in by members of different races.1
47
A. Applying the Loving Analogy to Same-Sex Conduct Laws
Given what would appear to be Loving's clear rejection of Pace's
"equal application" theory of equal protection doctrine, it is no surprise that
advocates of same-sex marriage would invoke Loving as a basis for apply-
ing intermediate scrutiny to laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, sodomy,
adoption, and the like, arguing that such laws draw facial distinctions on the
basis of sex. Just as "equal application" of the ban to all races in McLaugh-
lin and Loving did not insulate the laws in question from being treated as
drawing race-based classifications subject to strict scrutiny, so the "equal
application" of laws banning same-sex marriage, sodomy, adoption, and the
like to both men and women does not insulate them from being treated as
drawing sex-based classifications subject to intermediate scrutiny.
In the first wave of judicial challenges to laws prohibiting same-sex
marriage, this sort of analogy to Loving was dispensed with rather summari-
ly or ignored altogether, 4 but that is not particularly significant given the
state of equal protection jurisprudence at the time the challenges were
brought. These cases were adjudicated in the early 1970s, at a time when
the U.S. Supreme Court was still formally applying only rational basis re-
view to sex-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause. 49 Not
until 1973 did a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court indicate that height-
ened scrutiny applied to sex-based classifications, 5 ' and not until 1976 did
147 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-8, 10-11 (1967).
148 See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
149 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,76-77 (1971).
150 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973).
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a majority of the Court endorse that conclusion.'5 Thus, the Loving analogy
would have done little to advance the cause of the challengers to early
same-sex marriage laws, since even if characterized as drawing sex-based
classifications the laws would only have been subject to rational basis re-
view.
Yet by the 1990s, when the second wave of judicial challenges to laws
prohibiting same-sex marriage began, intermediate scrutiny for sex-based
classifications was firmly established and made the Loving argument far
more potent. As a result of these doctrinal developments, in the 1993 case
of Baehr v. Lewin the Supreme Court of Hawaii became the first court to
declare a state law prohibiting same-sex marriage unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds. The court characterized the law at issue as drawing a
sex-based classification and therefore subject to heightened scrutiny. In
drawing that conclusion, the Baehr court quoted the language excerpted
above from Loving and held that "[s]ubstitution of 'sex' for 'race'...
yields the precise case before us together with the conclusion that we have
reached."' 52
Concurring opinions in two other second wave decisions in Vermont
and Massachusetts likewise relied on the Loving analogy in determining
that such laws contained sex-based classifications subject to heightened
scrutiny. In Baker v. State,' Justice Johnson of the Vermont Supreme
Court provided a specific example to demonstrate the sex discrimination
inherent in the law:
[C]onsider the following example. Dr. A and Dr. B both want to marry Ms. C, an X-ray
technician. Dr. A may do so because Dr. A is a man. Dr. B may not because Dr. B is a wom-
an. Dr. A and Dr. B are people of opposite sexes who are similarly situated in the sense that
they both want to marry a person of their choice. The statute disqualifies Dr. B from mar-
riage solely on the basis of her sex and treats her differently from Dr. A, a man. This is sex
discrimination.'5
Justice Greaney of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court provided a
similar example concurring in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health.'55 Yet despite the "creative"' 56 and at least "superficially attrac-
tive"'57 analogy between the anti-miscegenation laws at issue in Loving and
151 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 208-09 (1976).
152 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993).
153 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
154 Id. at 906 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). To emphasize her point,
Justice Johnson indicated that to hold otherwise would mean that "a statute that required courts to give
custody of male children to fathers and female children to mothers would not be sex discrimination"
since both sexes are treated equally as a group. Id. at 906 n. 10.
155 798 N.E.2d 941, 970-71 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J., concurring).
156 See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 365 (Tex. App. 2001) (en banc) (Fowler, J., concurring),
rev'don other grounds sub nom. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
157 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 992 n.13 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
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laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, the Loving analogy for treating such
laws as sex-based classifications has been rejected in every subsequent
challenge, even by courts that otherwise declare the laws constitutionally
infirm on some other basis.
In distinguishing Loving, most judicial opinions note the Loving
Court's indication that the statute at issue did not, in fact, treat all of the
races equally. Rather, as the Loving Court indicated, "[w]hile Virginia pro-
hibits whites from marrying any nonwhite... Negroes, Orientals, and any
other racial class may intermarry without statutory interference."' 5" These
judicial opinions then draw attention to the following passage in Loving:
"The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white
persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own
justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy."'59 These
courts thus conclude that the evil involved in Loving was not the equal ap-
plication to different races, but rather a combination of the fact that the ap-
plication was not, in fact, equal as well as the fact that the classifications
were motivated by "White Supremacy." Thus, these courts conclude, in the
absence of evidence that the bans on same-sex marriage were motivated by
notions of male or female superiority akin to the notions of "White Su-
premacy" underlying the anti-miscegenation statutes, the Loving analogy
does not hold 6° and such laws are appropriately characterized as facially
neutral so far as sex is concerned. 6'
158 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 11 n. 11(1967).
159 Id. at 1I.
160 See Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1005 (D. Nev. 2012) ("The laws at issue here are
not directed toward persons of any particular gender, nor do they affect people of any particular gender
disproportionately such that a gender-based animus can reasonably be perceived.... Here, there is no
indication of any intent to maintain any notion of male or female superiority .... In Loving, the elements
of the disability were different as between Caucasians and non-Caucasians, whereas here, the burden on
men and women is the same. The distinction might be gender based if only women could marry a person
of the same sex, or if only women could marry a transgendered person, or if the restriction included
some other asymmetry between the burdens placed on men and the burdens placed on women."); In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 437 (Cal. 2008) ("The decisions in Perez and Loving v. Virginia, howev-
er, are clearly distinguishable from this case, because the antimiscegenation statutes at issue in those
cases plainly treated members of minority races differently from White persons, prohibiting only inter-
marriage that involved White persons in order to prevent (in the undisguised words of the defenders of
the statute in Perez) 'the Caucasian race from being contaminated by races whose members are by
nature physically and mentally inferior to Caucasians."' (citations omitted)); Conaway v. Deane, 932
A.2d 571, 600-02 (Md. 2007) ("The Supreme Court was able to see beyond the superficial neutrality of
the legislative enactment, however, and determined that '[t]he fact that Virginia prohibits only interra-
cial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their
own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.' Thus, the Court in Loving
determined that, although the statute applied on its face equally to all races, the underlying purpose was
to sustain White Supremacy and to subordinate African-Americans and other non-Caucasians as a class.
The reasoning behind this conclusion was based, at least in part, on the fact that '[w]hile Virginia pro-
hibits whites from marrying any nonwhite.... Negroes, Orientals, and any other racial class may
intermarry without statutory interference.' . .. Absent some showing that Family Law § 2-201 was
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B. Resurrecting the Ghost of Pace v. Alabama
There are several problems with this method of distinguishing Loving.
First, the rejection of Pace's "equal application" theory first appeared three
years before Loving in McLaughlin, which made no reference to "White
Supremacy. " ' 12 One court has acknowledged that in McLaughlin, the Court
"did not hold expressly that the latent purpose behind the cohabitation stat-
ute at issue was based on White Supremacy," but nonetheless characterizes
the McLaughlin Court's reasoning as "exceedingly similar to that employed
'designed to subordinate either men to women or women to men as a class,' we find the analogy to
Loving inapposite. Because there is no evidence in the record before us that the Legislature intended
with Family Law § 2-201 to differentiate between men and women as classes on the basis of some
misconception regarding gender roles in our society, we conclude that the [Maryland Equal Rights
Amendment] does not mandate that the State recognize same-sex marriage based on the analogy to
Loving." (alterations in original) (citations omitted)); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 992 (Cordy, J., dissent-
ing) ("Of course, a statute that on its face treats protected groups equally may still harm, stigmatize, or
advantage one over the other. Such was the circumstance in Loving v. Virginia .... While the statute
purported to apply equally to whites and nonwhites, the Court found that it was intended and structured
to favor one race (white) and disfavor all others (nonwhites). The statute's legislative history demon-
strated that its purpose was not merely to punish interracial marriage, but to do so for the sole benefit of
the white race. As the Supreme Court readily concluded, the Virginia law was 'designed to maintain
White Supremacy.' . . . By contrast, here there is no evidence that limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples was motivated by sexism in general or a desire to disadvantage men or women in particular.
Moreover, no one has identified any harm, burden, disadvantage, or advantage accruing to either gender
as a consequence of the Massachusetts marriage statute." (citations omitted)); Hemandez v. Robles, 855
N.E.2d 1, 11 (N.Y. 2006) ("This is not the kind of sham equality that the Supreme Court confronted in
Loving; the statute there, prohibiting black and white people from marrying each other, was in substance
anti-black legislation. Plaintiffs do not argue here that the legislation they challenge is designed to
subordinate either men to women or women to men as a class."); id. at 19-20 (Graffeo, J., concurring)
("Plaintiffs cite Loving for the proposition that a statute can discriminate even if it treats both classes
identically. This misconstrues the Loving analysis because the antimiscegenation statute did not treat
blacks and whites identically-it restricted who whites could marry (but did not restrict intermarriage
between non-whites) for the purpose of promoting white supremacy. Virginia's antimiscegenation
statute was the quintessential example of invidious racial discrimination as it was intended to advantage
one race and disadvantage all others, which is why the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny and struck
it down as violating the core interest of the Equal Protection Clause. In contrast, neither men nor women
are disproportionately disadvantaged or burdened by the fact that New York's Domestic Relations Law
allows only opposite-sex couples to marry-both genders are treated precisely the same way. As such,
there is no gender classification triggering intermediate scrutiny."); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880
n. 13 (Vt. 1999) ("Although the concurring and dissenting opinion invokes the United States Supreme
Court decision in Loving v. Virginia, the reliance is misplaced. There the high court had little difficulty
in looking behind the superficial neutrality of Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute to hold that its real
purpose was to maintain the pernicious doctrine of white supremacy." (citations omitted)).
161 See, e.g., Sevcik, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 1005; Conaway, 932 A.2d at 601-02; Baker, 744 A.2d at
880 n.13.
162 See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,191 (1964); see also Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 374 F.
Supp. 2d 861, 876 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 447 F.3d 673 (9th
Cir. 2006).
[VOL. 21:2
2014] GAY RIGHTS, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND CLASSIFICATION-FRAMING 361
in Loving."'63 The reasoning of the two cases is indeed "exceedingly simi-
lar," but that does not change the fact that the McLaughlin Court nowhere
made reference to the possibility that the law in question was motivated by
notions of racial superiority.
Second, and perhaps more significantly, this method of distinguishing
Loving ignores the full context of a footnote in which the Loving Court not-
ed the lack of even-handedness of the Virginia statute. In full, the footnote
reads as follows:
Appellants point out that the State's concern in these statutes, as expressed in the words of
the 1924 Act's title, "An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity," extends only to the integrity of
the white race. While Virginia prohibits whites from marrying any nonwhite (subject to the
exception for the descendants of Pocahontas), Negroes, Orientals, and any other racial class
may intermarry without statutory interference. Appellants contend that this distinction ren-
ders Virginia's miscegenation statutes arbitrary and unreasonable even assuming the consti-
tutional validity of an official purpose to preserve "racial integrity." We need not reach this
contention because we find the racial classifications in these statutes repugnant to the Four-
teenth Amendment, even assuming an even-handed state purpose to protect the "integrity" of
all races. 64
Reading this footnote in context, it is apparent that the Court mentioned the
"White Supremacy" and lack of evenhandedness as aspects of the law that
would confound the statute's constitutional infirmity, 65 rather than being
necessary to the decision. 66 Indeed, a logical corollary of distinguishing
Loving on the basis of "White Supremacy" would seem to be that anti-
miscegenation laws could be resurrected and would be constitutionally
permissible, 67 at least so long as they were even-handed in both intent and
effect.
163 Conaway, 932 A.2d at 601 n.30.
164 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 n.Il (1967) (emphasis added).
165 C( Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 630 (1996) ("If this consequence follows from Amendment
2, as its broad language suggests, it would compound the constitutional difficulties the law creates. The
state court did not decide whether the amendment has this effect, however, and neither need we.").
166 See Smelt, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 876 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ("Defendants contend Loving is not control-
ling because the Loving Court recognized the true discriminatory purpose behind the anti-miscegenation
laws was to 'maintain White Supremacy.' Here, Defendants argue, the purpose of DOMA is not to
elevate one sex over the other. This Court cannot accept this 'lack of discriminatory intent' argument.
First, Loving stated the laws' discriminatory intent was not essential to its holding: '[W]e find the racial
classifications in these statutes repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, even assuming an even-handed
state purpose to protect the 'integrity' of all races."' (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Loving, 388 U.S. at I I & n. 11)), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir.
2006); Conaway, 932 A.2d at 685 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) ("The Court reached its holding inde-
pendently of the issue of discriminatory intent, however, 'find[ing] the racial classifications in these
statutes repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, even assuming an even-handed state purpose to pro-
tect the "integrity" of all races.' Clearly, the Court found no legitimate purpose in the racial classifica-
tions themselves, regardless of the proffered justification." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
167 See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 370 (Tex. App. 2001) (en banc) (Anderson, J., dissent-
ing) ("[I]f 21.06 does not contain a sex-based classification because it applies equally to men and wom-
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A third problem with distinguishing Loving on the basis of racial supe-
riority is that doing so is inconsistent with numerous post-Loving decisions
by the U.S. Supreme Court involving laws that could fairly be described as
containing even-handed racial classifications that were clearly not grounded
in "White Supremacy." For example, in Powers v. Ohio,'68 the Supreme
Court rejected an argument that race-based peremptory challenges by pros-
ecutors should not be subject to strict scrutiny since jurors of all races are
equally subject to being challenged based on their race:
We reject as well the view that race-based peremptory challenges survive equal protection
scrutiny because members of all races are subject to like treatment, which is to say that white
jurors are subject to the same risk of peremptory challenges based on race as are all other j u-
rors. The suggestion that racial classifications may survive when visited upon all persons is
no more authoritative today than the case which advanced the theorem, Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896). This idea has no place in our modem equal protection jurisprudence. It
is axiomatic that racial classifications do not become legitimate on the assumption that all
persons suffer them in equal degree. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).169
Similarly, in Johnson v. California,17 1 the U.S. Supreme Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of a California Department of Corrections
("CDC") policy segregating all new prisoners by race for their first 60 days
of imprisonment. The rationale for the policy was to prevent interracial
violence between members of rival race-based gangs, and the 60-day period
was used to determine whether a prisoner might pose a danger to others. 7'
The Court once again rejected an argument that strict scrutiny should not
apply because the law was neutral:
The CDC claims that its policy should be exempt from our categorical rule because it is
"neutral"-that is, it "neither benefits nor burdens one group or individual more than any
other group or individual." In other words, strict scrutiny should not apply because all pris-
oners are "equally" segregated. The CDC's argument ignores our repeated command that
"racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to burden or benefit
the races equally." Indeed, we rejected the notion that separate can ever be equal-or "neu-
tral'"-50 years ago in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and we refuse to
resurrect it today.
72
Indeed, as a more general matter, a focus on the invidious purpose be-
hind the anti-miscegenation law at issue in Loving (and, by extension, the
en, then the anti-miscegenation statutes in Loving did not contain a race-based classification, with the
logical corollary that Loving was wrongly decided."), revd on other grounds, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
168 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
169 Id. at410.
170 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
171 Id. at 502-03.
172 Id. at 506 (citations omitted); see also Hemandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 29-30 (N.Y. 2006)
(Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (applying the Loving analogy to a law prohibiting same-sex marriage and citing
Johnson in support of that conclusion).
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same-sex marriage cases) is inconsistent with the Court's affirmative action
cases, in which the Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that the level
of scrutiny to be applied to facially discriminatory racial classifications
should vary depending upon the benign or invidious purpose behind the law
at issue.'73
The fourth and final problem with using purpose to distinguish Loving
is that its focus on men and women being treated equally as groups is less
consistent with modem U.S. Supreme Court equal protection precedent
than focusing on discrimination experienced by an individual who wishes to
marry a particular person but is denied the right to do so solely because of
sex. In modem cases applying strict scrutiny to race-based affirmative ac-
tion programs, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that equal protection
principles are designed to protect individuals, not groups, and thus when
government classifies an individual on the basis of race-such as a white
applicant denied the benefit of a race-based affirmative action program-
that individual is entitled to demand that the classification be subject to
strict scrutiny review.'74
As a separate basis for distinguishing Loving, at least one jurist has
held that the Loving analogy should be rejected because it arose in the con-
text of race-based classifications, while laws prohibiting same-sex marriage
instead involve sex classifications. Specifically, the court noted that, "To
date, the laws in which the Supreme Court has found sex-based classifica-
tions have all treated men and women differently. Supreme Court precedent
has only found sex-based classifications in laws that have a disparate im-
pact on one sex or the other. This case is not in that category.- '175
It is true, of course, that race-based and sex-based classifications are
different so far as the Equal Protection Clause is concerned, with the former
being subject to strict scrutiny and the latter being subject to intermediate
scrutiny. But aside from the difference in the level of scrutiny, the Court
has not applied a different set of equal protection principles to cases involv-
ing race and those involving sex, and indeed has frequently extended cases
involving racial classifications to cases involving sex classifications, noting
173 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 226 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion).
174 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 742-43 (2007);
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Pena, 515 U.S. at 227; see also Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 1039
(Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J., dissenting) ("The Loving Court recognized the individual character of the
freedom at stake: '[u]nder our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not many, a person of another race
resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.' ... In every instance where a man is
denied the ability to marry the man of his choice, but a woman is not, that man bears a burden that the
woman does not." (citations omitted)).
175 Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 876-77 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (internal citation
omitted), affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006).
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that the former are "premised on equal protection principles that apply
equally to gender discrimination."'76
In sum, the repeated resurrection of what can only be described as the
ghost of Pace v. Alabama in cases challenging bans on same-sex marriage
is inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's modem equal protection
precedents. The Court has clearly, and repeatedly, rejected the idea that
"equal application" of a law using suspect lines insulates it from heightened
scrutiny; that the level of scrutiny varies depending upon the benign or in-
vidious purpose behind a facially discriminatory law; that the proper focus
should be on group rather than individual equality; or that race-based and
sex-based classifications are treated any differently, save for the difference
in the level of scrutiny. In contrast to recent cases upholding same-sex mar-
riage prohibitions as lacking an invidious purpose discriminating against
men or women generally, lower courts would be conforming to U.S. Su-
preme Court precedent by treating bans on same-sex marriage, adoption,
benefits, or conduct as sex discrimination against individuals and assessing
their constitutionality as such.
C. Why the Court Might Nonetheless Avoid the Loving Analogy
In spite of strong doctrinal arguments in favor of treating laws that tar-
get same-sex conduct as a subset of sex discrimination, there are two prag-
matic reasons why the U.S. Supreme Court might be reluctant to follow that
path and would instead choose to characterize such laws as discriminating
on the basis of sexual orientation.
First, and as implied above, the Court might wish to independently de-
termine the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny for laws that discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation. One reason for wanting to do so is a be-
lief that sex and sexual orientation are truly distinct, such that government
might sometimes be justified in drawing distinctions on one of those bases
but not the other, and treating sexual orientation as a subset of sex discrimi-
nation would prevent the Court from easily drawing such distinctions in
future cases.
A second reason for treating such laws as discriminating on the basis
of sexual orientation, and independently determining the appropriate level
of judicial scrutiny to apply, is to make that level of scrutiny available in
future cases in which the laws at issue target sexual orientation directly (as
in the Romer case) and therefore cannot accurately be characterized as dis-
criminating on the basis of sex.
Third, the Loving analogy, while appealing and doctrinally defensible,
would require the Court to clearly and definitively extend its rejection of
the equal application theory outside the realm of race discrimination. This is
176 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994).
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a step the Court might be unwilling to take for fear of any unintended con-
sequences that such a decision might have for other laws involving separat-
ing the sexes. For example, the Court has not yet resolved the constitution-
ality of single-sex public education'77 and may, at some point, want to be
able to uphold the practice by relying upon the "equal application" theo-
ry. 178
III. A THIRD PATH: COUPLES-BASED FRAMING
The In re Marriage Cases discussion examined in Part I regarding the
relational rather than individual nature of sexual orientation suggests an
alternative method of framing same-sex marriage cases. Raising a consider-
ation separate from the issue of sex or sexual orientation discrimination,
under this approach the correct focus is on the couple rather than the indi-
vidual. Same-sex marriage cases, so the argument goes, should compare the
treatment of same-sex couples on the one hand to opposite-sex couples on
the other.
This alternative method of framing is the approach taken by the Ver-
mont and Massachusetts high courts when addressing the constitutionality
of state laws excluding same-sex couples from marriage. Thus, for exam-
ple, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained:
We use the terms "same sex" and "opposite sex" when characterizing the couples in ques-
tion, because these terms are more accurate in this context than the terms "homosexual" or
"heterosexual," although at times we use those terms when we consider them appropriate.
Nothing in our marriage law precludes people who identify themselves (or who are identified
by others) as gay, lesbian, or bisexual from marrying persons of the opposite sex. 179
This method of framing equal protection challenges to laws denying
rights to same-sex couples has also been used recently-at least in part-by
two federal courts of appeals. In Diaz v. Brewer,' the Ninth Circuit had
before it a challenge to an Arizona law making benefits available only for
the spouses of public employees and-when considered in light of the
state's prohibition on same-sex marriage-thus treating same-sex and op-
177 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 n.7 (1996); Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720 n.1 (1982).
178 Alternatively, the Court could reject the equal application theory but nonetheless conclude that
such a law satisfies intermediate scrutiny.
179 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 953 n.l I (Mass. 2003); see also Baker v.
State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 (Vt. 1999) ("The first step in our analysis is to identify the nature of the statu-
tory classification. As noted, the marriage statutes apply expressly to opposite-sex couples. Thus, the
statutes exclude anyone who wishes to marry someone of the same sex.").
180 656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2011).
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posite-sex couples differently. 8' In striking the law down, the Ninth Circuit
did not focus at all on sexual orientation, addressing instead the differential
treatment of same-sex and opposite-sex couples and finding the resulting
discrimination to be irrational.'82
In Windsor v. United States,'83 the Second Circuit engaged in a hybrid
analysis that focused in part on the sexual orientation of the individuals and
in part on their status as part of a same-sex couple when considering a chal-
lenge to DOMA. In deciding whether or not to apply heightened scrutiny to
a law discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, the court had to as-
sess one of the factors that the U.S. Supreme Court has identified for ac-
cording a classification heightened scrutiny: the discreteness or visibility of
the trait associated with the classification.'84 In concluding that intermediate
scrutiny was the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to DOMA, the Wind-
sor court concluded that a focus on same-sex couples rather than homosex-
ual individuals made it easier to characterize sexual orientation as a "dis-
crete" or visible characteristic akin to sex or race, reasoning as follows:
The class affected by Section 3 of DOMA is composed entirely of persons of the same sex
who have married each other. Such persons constitute a subset of the larger category of ho-
mosexuals; ... there is nothing amorphous, capricious, or tentative about their sexual orien-
tation. Married same-sex couples like Windsor and Spyer are the population most visible to
the law, and they are foremost in mind when reviewing DOMA's constitutionality.
We therefore conclude that sexual orientation is a sufficiently distinguishing character-
istic to identify the discrete minority class of homosexuals.85
There is a clear advantage to framing same-sex marriage laws as dis-
criminating against same-sex couples. Doing so eliminates the argument
that such laws-when characterized as sexual orientation discrimination-
are facially neutral, since under these laws the facial discrimination against
same-sex couples is apparent (subject to one caveat considered supra in Part
IV).
At first glance, this focus on couples as opposed to individuals seems
inconsistent with the Court's repeated admonishment that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause protects individuals, not groups.'86 Yet to frame the issue as one
involving the rights of a couple is not the same as framing something as a
group right. What the Court meant by its admonishment is that the Equal
Protection Clause is there to protect all individuals-whether they be mem-
bers of a minority group such as African Americans or members of a major-
181 Id. at 1010.
182 Id. at 1014-15.
183 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aft'don other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
184 See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686
(1973) (plurality opinion).
185 Windsor, 699 F.3d at 184 (citation omitted).
186 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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ity group such as whites-from racial discrimination, rather than only pro-
tecting members of minority groups from such discrimination.
A more significant concern is the extent to which switching the focus
from gay and lesbian individuals to same-sex couples affects the question
of whether heightened scrutiny is appropriate under the Equal Protection
Clause. One of the other factors that the U.S. Supreme Court has identified
for determining whether to apply heightened scrutiny to a given classifica-
tion is whether the trait at issue can be characterized as "immutable."' 87
While one's sexual orientation could fairly be characterized as immutable,
is it fair to similarly characterize the act of forming a same-sex union,
which is more volitional in nature?
To be sure, as the Second Circuit noted in Windsor, many of the other
classifications for which the Court has recognized heightened scrutiny-
alienage, illegitimacy, and national origin-involve characteristics that do
not become apparent until the individuals undertake a volitional act that
makes the trait visible.' 8 Yet the Second Circuit in Windsor, unlike the
Vermont and Massachusetts high courts and the Ninth Circuit in Diaz, did
not engage in pure couples-based framing. Instead, it characterized same-
sex couples as "a subset of the larger category of homosexuals," and drew
an analogy between alienage, illegitimacy, and national origin-all individ-
ual traits-on the one hand and sexual orientation-also an individual
trait-on the other. In effect, then, the Windsor court did not actually per-
ceive the statute as facially neutral as to sexual orientation. Instead, it
viewed the statute as facially targeting a subset of homosexuals and consid-
ered the act of coupling as merely a volitional act that brought that underly-
ing individual trait to light. The Second Circuit's approach in Windsor is
therefore fundamentally different from that of the Vermont and Massachu-
setts high courts and the Ninth Circuit in Diaz. There, the courts recognized
same-sex couples but without recognizing any underlying immutable indi-
vidual trait of sexual orientation. This latter approach makes it difficult to
classify the act of coupling as immutable because choosing to be part of a
same-sex couple is volitional in nature and thus might make it harder to
persuade a court to apply heightened scrutiny on the basis of such a classi-
fication. Accordingly, while pure couples-based framing can help to over-
come a defense that a law targeting same-sex conduct is facially neutral for
equal protection purposes, asserting an equal protection claim around a
couples-based approach may mean that the best a challenger can hope for is
rational basis scrutiny. Obtaining heightened equal protection scrutiny like-
ly requires that challengers characterize a law as targeted at sex or sexual
orientation, or by means of a hybrid approach akin to that employed by the
Second Circuit in Windsor. Thus, pure couples-based framing is best used
only in those circumstances in which a court is unwilling to accept charac-
187 See Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638; Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion).
188 See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 183-84.
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terization of a same-sex-conduct law as drawing distinctions on the basis of
sex or sexual orientation, and where rational basis review alone is sufficient
to prevail.
IV. CROSS-REFERENCING AND THE RELEVANCE OF BEING AN
ADDITIONAL STEP REMOVED
As indicated in the Introduction, there exists a category of laws which
I have described as cross-referenced same-sex-conduct laws and which
requires separate consideration. Such laws on their face make no mention
whatsoever of sexual orientation and also do not-on their face-refer to
same-sex couples. Thus, at least as a matter of first impression, such laws
might be deemed as not facially discriminatory against same-sex couples,
thus making it impossible for a court to follow even the alternative path
described in Part III. Two statutes currently being challenged in the lower
courts-one from Arizona and the other from Michigan-illustrate this
problem.
The Arizona law provides that health benefits can only be provided to
the children or "spouse" of public employees, and it is only when consid-
ered in conjunction with the state's constitutional ban on same-sex marriage
that the discriminatory impact on same-sex couples (and by extension, gay
and lesbian persons) becomes apparent.'89 The Michigan law provides that
health benefits can only be provided to those who are married to, a depend-
ent of,9° or otherwise eligible to inherit from a public employee under the
state's law of intestate succession. 9' It is only by reference to other laws-
including the state's ban on same-sex mamiage-that the discrimination
becomes evident.
92
After a federal district court struck down the Arizona scheme on equal
protection grounds, the state appealed.' 93 In defending its law against an
equal protection challenge, the State of Arizona contended that the law is
facially neutral not only with regard to sexual orientation discrimination but
also with the regard to the type of coupling involved:
Section 0, despite the district court's repeated assertions, does not distinguish between em-
ployees based on whether they are in a same-sex or opposite-sex relationship or, for that mat-
ter, whether they identify as heterosexual or homosexual. Rather, Section 0 distinguishes be-
tween married and unmarried employees, by affording benefits to an employee's marital
spouse but not an employee's nonmarital partner. Simply put, Section 0 cares not about an
189 See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011).
190 As defined by the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, I.R.C. §152 (1986).
191 See MICH. COMP. LAW SERV. § 15.583 (LexisNexis 2007).
192 Supra note 22.
193 See Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 814 (D. Ariz. 2010).
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employee's sexual orientation or the sex of his or her partner; its distribution of benefits de-
pends solely on an employee's marital status.
94
The Ninth Circuit, however, was unwilling to view the challenged statute
stripped of its context: "Since in this case eligibility was limited to married
couples, different-sex couples wishing to retain their current family health
benefits could alter their status-marry-to do so. The Arizona Constitu-
tion, however, prohibits same-sex couples from doing so." '95
Similarly, a federal district court adjudicating the constitutionality of
Michigan's law looked at the challenged law in full context:
Although the act does not use the term "sexual orientation," it both explicitly incorporates
statutes that draw classifications based on sexual orientation and renders access to benefits
legally impossible only for gay and lesbian couples. The Act incorporates the definitions in
the Michigan marriage amendment and the intestacy statute. Both of those laws distinguish
between opposite-sex couples, who are permitted to marry and can inherit under intestacy,
and same-sex couples, who cannot.
9 6
This willingness to look beyond the four comers of a law to determine
whether or not it is facially neutral or facially discriminatory is necessary if
the guarantee of equal protection is to have any meaning. Surely a state
cannot avoid equal protection scrutiny by writing a statute in a way that
makes it appear to be facially neutral while nevertheless incorporating by
reference other provisions that are facially discriminatory. In other words,
when a statute incorporates by reference other provisions, the act of cross-
referencing makes the latter part and parcel of the former.
The U.S. Supreme Court's precedents support this willingness to look
beyond the four comers of a statute. In cases decided under the Fifteenth
Amendment-which, like the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment, has been interpreted to have a discriminatory purpose re-
quirement' 97-the Court has been willing to dig beyond the face of a law to
determine whether discriminatory intent exists. In those cases, in which the
face of the challenged laws was neutral on race, the Court emphasized that
the "[Fifteenth] Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-
minded modes of discrimination."'' 8 Moreover, in subsequent cases, the
Court has cited these Fifteenth Amendment cases in support of the proposi-
194 Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Arizona Policy Supporting Defendants-Appellants and
Reversal of the District Court Decision at 4-5, Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D. Ariz. 2010)
(No. 10-16797).
195 Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2011).
196 Bassett v. Snyder, No. 12-10038, 2013 WL 3285111, at *18 (E.D. Mich. June 28, 2013).
197 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980), superseded by statute as recognized in
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
198 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960) (alteration in original) (citing Lane v. Wilson,
307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)).
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tion that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause is offended by 'sophisticated as
well as simple-minded modes of discrimination."" 99
Like the Ninth Circuit, other lower courts have similarly been willing
to look beyond the four comers of such ostensibly neutral laws. One of the
earliest courts to do so was the Alaska Supreme Court in its 2005 Alaska
Civil Liberties Union v. State °° decision. There, the Alaska Supreme Court
rejected an argument that a benefits scheme was facially neutral when it
classified people not on the basis of sex or sexual orientation but marital
status and made benefits available to spouses of public employees but not
unmarried domestic partners of the same sex.20 The court began by examin-
ing the interplay between the challenged benefits scheme and the state's
prohibition of same-sex marriage:
Article 1, section 25 was adopted by Alaska voters in 1998. Commonly known as the Mar-
riage Amendment, it provides: "To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist
only between one man and one woman." It effectively prohibits marriage in Alaska between
persons of the same sex. The plaintiff employees consequently cannot enter into the formal
relationship-marriage-that the benefits programs require if the employees are to confer
these benefits on their domestic partners.
Put another way, the plaintiff employees and their same-sex partners are absolutely
precluded from becoming eligible for these benefits. Although all opposite-sex couples who
are unmarried are also ineligible for these employment benefits, by marrying they can change
the status that makes them ineligible.
202
The court then treated the two separate provisions interchangeably in de-
termining facial neutrality:
[U]nlike the neutral definition of "veteran" in Feeney, Alaska's definition of the legal status
of "marriage" (and, hence, who can be a "spouse") excludes same-sex couples. By restricting
the availability of benefits to "spouses," the benefits programs "by [their] own terms
classiqy]" same-sex couples "for different treatment." Heterosexual couples in legal rela-
tionships have the opportunity to marry and become eligible for benefits. In comparison, be-
cause of the legal definition of "marriage," the partner of a homosexual employee can never
be legally considered as that employee's "spouse" and, hence, can never become eligible for
benefits. We therefore conclude that the benefits programs are facially discriminatory. 203
A second objection that defenders of cross-referenced same-sex con-
duct laws might raise is that the challengers' real dispute is with the under-
lying restriction on same-sex marriage and not the denial of domestic part-
nership benefits, and thus unless they are willing to challenge that underly-
ing law-or if that underlying law has already been adjudicated to be con-
199 United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 729 (1992); accord Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
563 (1964).
200 122 P.3d 781 (Alaska 2005).
201 Id. at 788.
202 Id. at 784 (footnote omitted).
203 Id. at 788-89 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
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stitutionally valid-they have no basis for challenging a benefits law prem-
ised on the underlying restriction.
Yet it would be inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent to con-
clude that those negatively impacted by such laws must bring their constitu-
tional challenge against the underlying discriminatory scheme rather than
taking the lesser step of challenging the denial of benefits to unmarried
same-sex couples. Consider in this regard McLaughlin, where the challenge
was brought not to Florida's marriage laws but instead to its law banning
interracial cohabitation.2" One could likewise have contended in that case
that the challengers' real dispute was with the ban on interracial marriage.
After all, if only they could legally marry they would not be subject to
prosecution for interracial cohabitation, since the law they were challenging
punished only cohabitation between unmarried "whites" and "negroes."
Indeed, in defense of the law, the State of Florida described the cohabitation
law as an adjunct to its ban on interracial marriage and characterized the
latter as constitutionally valid, thus rendering the cohabitation law immune
from challenge.0 5 Yet the Court viewed the two arguments as raising sepa-
rate claims:
Florida's remaining argument is related to its law against interracial marriage, which, in the
light of certain legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, is said to be immune from
attack under the Equal Protection Clause. Its interracial cohabitation law is likewise valid, it
is argued, because it is ancillary to and serves the same purpose as the miscegenation law it-
self.
We reject this argument, without reaching the question of the validity of the State's
prohibition against interracial marriage or the soundness of the arguments rooted in the histo-
ry of the Amendment. For even if we posit the constitutionality of the ban against the mar-
riage of a Negro and a white, it does not follow that the cohabitation law is not to be subject-
ed to independent examination under thc Fourteenth Amendment. "[A]ssuming, for purposes
of argument only, that the basic prohibition is constitutional," in this case the law against in-
terracial marriage, "it does not follow that there is no constitutional limit to the means which
may be used to enforce it." Section 798.05 must therefore itself pass muster under the Four-
teenth Amendment; and for reasons quite similar to those already given, we think it fails the
test.
... We accordingly invalidate § 798.05 without expressing any views about the State's
prohibition of interracial marriage, and reverse these convictions.
2
0
6
In sum, to the extent that a law cross-references other laws that facially
discriminate against gays and lesbians or same-sex couples, they are indis-
tinguishable from laws that themselves facially discriminate against gays
and lesbians or same-sex couples and thus should be treated no differently
for equal protection purposes. Moreover, those challenging such laws may
do so even if the cross-referenced laws, standing alone, are constitutionally
valid, or if they wish-for strategic purposes-to avoid adjudication of the
constitutionality of the cross-referenced laws standing alone.
204 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 186 (1964).
205 Id. at 195.
206 Id. at 195-96 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
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V. READING THE TEA LEAVES OF THE SUPREME COURT'S EXISTING GAY
RIGHTS PRECEDENTS
The U.S. Supreme Court has only rarely adjudicated what might be
described as "gay rights" cases. Moreover, of the ten cases that can argua-
bly be so characterized, in only two-Romer v. Evans and United States v.
Windsor-did a majority of the Court actually address an equal protection
claim head-on. Of the remaining eight, five were decided on First Amend-
ment grounds, °7 two on substantive due process grounds,0 ' and one on
standing grounds." 9 Romer and Windsor, together with dicta in one of the
First Amendment cases and separate opinions in one of the substantive due
process cases, collectively shed some light on how the Court-or at least
individual members of the Court-might resolve the classification-framing
quandary for gay rights equal protection claims in the future.
A. Romer v. Evans
The majority opinion in Romer does little to illuminate the classifica-
tion-framing quandary. In that case, the facial discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation could not have been more apparent. The amendment to
the Colorado Constitution at issue in that case-Amendment 2-read as
follows:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or en-
force any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all re-
spects self-executing.
210
Amendment 2 thus explicitly focused on those of "homosexual, lesbian, or
bisexual orientation," making it clear that sexual minorities were the class
targeted by the law, and thus raised no classification-framing difficulties.
207 See John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2814 (2010); Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the
Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2976 (2010); Rumsfeld v. Forum
for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 70 (2006); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640, 659 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 581 (1995).
208 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196
(1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
209 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013).
210 See COLO. CONST. art. 11, § 30b (emphasis added).
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Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer, however-in which he contended
that the equal protection challenge in the case was effectively foreclosed by
the Court's 1986 decision in Bowers-suggests that at least he (and the
other Justices who signed onto his dissent) might agree that homosexual
status and conduct should be treated as one and the same for equal protec-
tion purposes:
If it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it
is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual
conduct. (As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has aptly put it: "If the
Court [in Bowers] was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the behavior that de-
fines the class, it is hardly open ... to conclude that state sponsored discrimination against
the class is invidious. After all, there can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a
class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal.") ... Respondents ... counter
Bowers with the argument that a greater-includes-the-lesser rationale cannot justify Amend-
ment 2's application to individuals who do not engage in homosexual acts, but are merely of
homosexual "orientation." Some Courts of Appeals have concluded that, with respect to laws
of this sort at least, that is a distinction without a difference....
But assuming that, in Amendment 2, a person of homosexual "orientation" is someone
who does not engage in homosexual conduct but merely has a tendency or desire to do so,
Bowers still suffices to establish a rational basis for the provision. If it is rational to criminal-
ize the conduct, surely it is rational to deny special favor and protection to those with a self-
avowed tendency or desire to engage in the conduct. Indeed, where criminal sanctions are not
involved, homosexual "orientation" is an acceptable stand-in for homosexual conduct.
2 1
B. Lawrence v. Texas
In contrast to the express discrimination against sexual minorities at
issue in Romer, when the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of Texas's sodomy law in 2003, the discrimi-
nation was more subtle. In Lawrence v. Texas, the text of the statute at issue
did not, in direct terms, target those who were gay, lesbian, or bisexual.
Rather, it provided that "[a] person commits an offense if he engages in
deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex."22 The
statute was challenged on the grounds that it violated substantive due pro-
cess and alternatively that it was sex or sexual orientation discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.2 3 Lawrence thus presented the
lower courts-and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court-with an opportunity
to grapple with the classification-framing quandary.
In the Court of Appeals of Texas, the majority rejected the argument
that the statute constituted a form of sex discrimination, rejecting the Lov-
211 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641-42 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
212 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2011). In turn, Texas law defined "deviate sexual
intercourse" to mean "any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus
of another person" or "the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object." Id.
§ 21.01(1). The statute itself was entitled "Homosexual Conduct," id. at § 21.06, although as indicated
below, the Court distinguished orientation from conduct.
213 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003).
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ing analogy for reasons similar to those found in other same-sex marriage
cases:
Appellants claim Section 21.06 discriminates on the basis of sex because criminal conduct is
determined to some degree by the gender of the actors....
The State asserts the statute applies equally to men and women, i.e., two men engaged
in homosexual conduct face the same sanctions as two women. Thus, the State maintains the
statute does not discriminate on the basis of gender. Appellants respond by observing that a
similar rationale was expressly rejected in the context of racial discrimination [in Loving].
... But while the purpose of Virginia's miscegenation statute was to segregate the rac-
es and perpetuate the notion that blacks are inferior to whites, no such sinister motive can be
ascribed to the criminalization of homosexual conduct. In other words, we find nothing in the
history of Section 21.06 to suggest it was intended to promote any hostility between the sex-
es, preserve any unequal treatment as between men and women, or perpetuate any societal or
cultural bias with regard to gender. Thus, we find appellants' reliance on Loving unpersua-
sive.'
14
The Court of Appeals majority went on to characterize the statute as "gen-
der-neutral on its face" and said the challengers bore the "burden of show-
ing the statute has had an adverse effect upon one gender and that such dis-
proportionate impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose. '  In con-
trast, the dissent, drawing on the Loving analogy, viewed the sex discrimi-
nation as patent."z 6
The Court of Appeals majority also concluded that the law was facial-
ly neutral on sexual orientation, relying in part on Dr. Alfred Kinsey's stud-
ies of human sexuality and his seven-point continuum:
On its face, the statute makes no classification on the basis of sexual orientation; rather, the
statute is expressly directed at conduct. While homosexuals may be disproportionately af-
fected by the statute, we cannot assume homosexual conduct is limited only to those pos-
sessing a homosexual "orientation." Persons having a predominately heterosexual inclination
may sometimes engage in homosexual conduct. Thus, the statute's proscription applies, fa-
cially at least, without respect to a defendant's sexual orientation.
21 7
However, the Court of Appeals of Texas acknowledged that a facially
neutral statute can nonetheless be challenged on equal protection grounds if
it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose and had a discriminatory ef-
214 See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 357-58 (Tex. App. 2001) (en banc), rev'd on other
grounds, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); accord id. at 365 (Fowler, J., concurring) ("That argument is creative,
but misguided. In Loving, the Court struck down a statute because the statute furthered a loathsome
discrimination-racism that implied a 'superior' white person marrying an 'inferior' black person does
so at the risk of both being punished. The Loving court correctly recognized that this was the kind of
discriminatory law sought to be vanquished by the Fourteenth Amendment; one that advanced the
fallacy of racial superiority. However, Loving is not on point in this case because section 21.06 does not
advance the fallacy of gender superiority.").
215 See id. at 359 (majority opinion).
216 See id. at 368-69 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
217 Id. at 353 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted).
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fect.2 " The court then recognized that the 1973 change in the law to target
only "homosexual sodomy" after a long history of criminalizing all sodo-
my, whether performed by persons of the same or different sex, sufficed to
show a discriminatory purpose.1 9
The case was thus teed up for the U.S. Supreme Court to address the
equal protection claim and, in so doing, resolve the classification-framing
quandary. Yet while characterizing the equal protection claim as "a tenable
argument," the Court opted instead to resolve the case on substantive due
process grounds and overruled its earlier decision in Bowers,22° perhaps in
part because of some of the challenges associated with framing the classifi-
cation as debated in the lower court's opinion. However, the Court went on
to suggest that it viewed laws targeting homosexual conduct as synonymous
with those targeting homosexual orientation:
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by
the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the lat-
ter point advances both interests. If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which
does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it
were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons. When homosexual conduct is
made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to sub-
ject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.22'
Moreover, Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, concluded that
the Texas law violated the Equal Protection Clause.222 In so doing, she re-
jected the argument that the law did not discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation, relying in part on the majority's linkage between conduct and
orientation and on Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Romer:
Texas argues, however, that the sodomy law does not discriminate against homosexual per-
sons. Instead, the State maintains that the law discriminates only against homosexual con-
duct. While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is
conduct that is closely correlated with being homosexual. Under such circumstances, Texas'
sodomy law is targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed toward gay persons as a
class. "After all, there can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than mak-
ing the conduct that defines the class criminal." When a State makes homosexual conduct
criminal, and not "deviate sexual intercourse" committed by persons of different sexes, "that
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination
both in the public and in the private spheres.-
223
Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia appeared to argue that the Texas law
discriminated neither on the basis of sexual orientation nor sex. Justice
218 id.
219 Id.
220 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
221 Id. (emphasis added).
222 Id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
223 Id. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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Scalia described the statute as facially neutral on both sex and sexual orien-
tation, writing that "[o]n its face § 21.06(a) applies equally to all persons.
Men and women, heterosexuals and homosexuals, are all subject to its pro-
hibition of deviate sexual intercourse with someone of the same sex. 224
Justice Scalia acknowledged that there is sex discrimination in the sense
that liability turns on the sex of the partner with whom the acts are per-
formed, but he rejected the Loving analogy and thus the conclusion that the
statute should be analyzed as drawing a sex-based classification:
To be sure, § 21.06 does distinguish between the sexes insofar as concerns the partner with
whom the sexual acts are performed: men can violate the law only with other men, and
women only with other women. But this cannot itself be a denial of equal protection, since it
is precisely the same distinction regarding partner that is drawn in state laws prohibiting mar-
riage with someone of the same sex while permitting marriage with someone of the opposite
sex.
The objection is made, however, that the antimiscegenation laws invalidated in Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967), similarly were applicable to whites and blacks alike, and
only distinguished between the races insofar as the partner was concerned. In Loving, how-
ever, we correctly applied heightened scrutiny, rather than the usual rational-basis review,
because the Virginia statute was "designed to maintain White Supremacy." A racially dis-
criminatory purpose is always sufficient to subject a law to strict scrutiny, even a facially
neutral law that makes no mention of race. No purpose to discriminate against men or wom-
en as a class can be gleaned from the Texas law, so rational-basis review applies.
225
Justice Scalia then expressed skepticism-albeit grudging acceptance of-
Justice O'Connor's characterization of the statute as discriminating on the
basis of sexual orientation.2 6
With Bowers no longer good law after Lawrence, it is not necessary
for advocates of gay rights, or jurists who support their constitutional
claims, to resort to the mental gymnastics of distinguishing homosexual
conduct from homosexual status. Furthermore, the Court has never formally
endorsed such a distinction. To the extent that such a distinction was ever
implicit in the Court's precedents, the majority and concurring opinions in
Lawrence clearly move equal protection jurisprudence, so far as sexual-
orientation discrimination is concerned, in the direction of status-conduct
re-convergence. This important step will affect the way in which lower
courts and the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately resolve the classification-
framing quandary.
224 Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225 Id. at 599-600 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
226 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 600-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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C. Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California,
Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez
In addition to Lawrence, a more recent gay rights case decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court provides strong support for the concept of status-
conduct re-convergence. In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,227 the Court
rejected a claim by a student group that it was seeking to discriminate not
on the basis of status but rather on the basis of conduct. Although formally
decided on First Amendment rather than equal protection grounds, the
Court relied on both Lawrence and Bray to conclude that the propounded
distinction was illusory:
CLS contends that it does not exclude individuals because of sexual orientation, but rather
"on the basis of a conjunction of conduct and the belief that the conduct is not wrong." Our
decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this context. See Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575, 123 S.Ct. 2572, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) ("When homo-
sexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination." (emphasis added)); id., at 583,
123 S.Ct. 2472 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("While it is true that the law applies
only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is closely correlated with be-
ing homosexual. Under such circumstances, [the] law is targeted at more than conduct. It is
instead directed toward gay persons as a class."); cf. Bray v. Alexandria Women 's Health
Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270, 113 S.Ct.753, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993) ("A tax on wearing yarmul-
kes is a tax on Jews.").
228
Indeed, the many lower court opinions examined earlier in this Article
which have rejected efforts to characterize laws that target same-sex con-
duct as facially neutral as to sexual orientation have relied upon either the
majority and/or concurring opinions in Lawrence or the Court's decision in
Christian Legal Society to conclude that-for equal protection purposes-
"[h]omosexual conduct and identity together define what it means to be gay
or lesbian." '229
D. The Most Recent Developments-Hollingsworth v. Perry and
Windsor v. United States
In the Court's most recent set of decisions involving gay rights, the
classification-framing quandary was touched upon both in oral arguments
and in one of the Court's opinions. During oral arguments regarding the
227 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
228 Id. at 2990 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
229 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2010); accord Kerrigan v.
Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431 n.24 (Conn. 2008); Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885
(Iowa 2009); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 605-06 (Md. 2007); Elane Photography, LLC v.
Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 437 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
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constitutionality of California's Proposition 8 in Hollingsworth v. Perry,
Justice Kennedy raised the question of whether the ban on same-sex mar-
riage "can be treated as a gender-based classification," describing it as "a
difficult question" that he was "trying to wrestle with. '23 ' Although counsel
for the defenders of Proposition 8 rejected that classification, they conceded
that it qualified as a "sexual orientation" classification, 3 thus implicitly
acknowledging the concept of status-conduct re-convergence evident in the
Court's recent line of gay rights cases.
Since the Court resolved Hollingsworth on standing grounds, the
Court's opinion in that case never faced the classification-framing quandary
that Justice Kennedy touched upon during oral arguments. In United States
v. Windsor, the Court addressed the equal protection challenge to DOMA
on the merits. 232 Yet Justice Kennedy's majority opinion side-stepped the
question of whether to treat DOMA's prohibition on recognizing same-sex
marriages as sex-based discrimination or discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation. Indeed, the Court's opinion made no mention of the liti-
gants' sexual orientation at all, never once using the terms "gay," "lesbian,"
or "homosexual" to describe the impacted class. Rather, Justice Kennedy
opted for couples-based framing akin to that employed by the Ninth Circuit
in Diaz v. Brewer, describing the impacted class as "those persons who are
joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the State. 233
The framing employed by Justice Kennedy in Windsor provides some
support for the couples-based method of framing, particularly when paired
with the fact that the Court had been holding the petition for certiorari in
Diaz but denied certiorari the day after issuing its opinion in Windsor.234
Yet the fact that the Court used that approach in Windsor-and perhaps
tacitly approved of its use in Diaz--does not necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion that the Court has resolved the question of whether to treat such laws
as making sex-based or sexual orientation-based classifications. Both the
Supreme Court in Windsor and the Ninth Circuit in Diaz struck down the
laws at issue by applying rational basis scrutiny, at least as a formal matter.
As a result, there was no need for either court to grapple with the complexi-
ties associated with following the sex or sexual orientation paths. In other
words, since the laws at issue in both cases unquestionably facially discrim-
inated against same-sex couples, and since the courts concluded that dis-
tinctions between same-sex and opposite-sex couples in those contexts
could not withstand even rationality review, there was nothing to be
achieved by framing the discrimination as sex-based (and thus employing
230 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-
144).
231 Id. at 14.
232 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
233 Id. at 2695.
234 See Brewer v. Diaz, 133 S. Ct. 2884 (2013) (mem.).
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intermediate scrutiny) or sexual orientation-based (and resolving whether
such classifications should be subject to heightened equal protection scruti-
ny). Thus, while cases such as Windsor and Diaz direct lower courts to the
third, alternative method of framing in situations where a law is unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the level of scrutiny,
such decisions do not foreclose framing such laws as sex-based or sexual
orientation-based classifications in cases in which a law might pass muster
under rational basis review but not under intermediate or strict scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated in this Article, when assessing the constitutionality of
laws that more subtly discriminate against gays and lesbians by targeting
same-sex relationships rather than targeting sexual orientation explicitly,
there are at least three ways to frame the discriminatory classification for
equal protection purposes: as sex discrimination, sexual orientation discrim-
ination, or discrimination against same-sex couples. All of these approaches
are consistent with U.S. Supreme Court equal protection precedents and any
of them would satisfy the threshold requirement for bringing an equal pro-
tection claim.
At present, litigants need not choose which of these paths to follow
and can instead frame cases in the alternative by asking the court to find
them constitutionally infirm no matter which method of framing is em-
ployed. Ultimately, however, lower courts and eventually the U.S. Supreme
Court will have to face the issue directly and select from among the com-
peting methods of framing.235 Whichever path the lower courts, and ulti-
mately the U.S. Supreme Court, choose to follow in framing gay rights
claims, one conclusion is clear: such claims should not falter on the ground
that they fail to satisfy the threshold requirement of discriminating against a
class. With that threshold requirement satisfied, courts can thus proceed to
determine the appropriate level of scrutiny and determine whether the laws
satisfy that level of scrutiny, rather than disposing of such claims without
ever reaching the merits of the challengers' claims.
235 But see In re Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145, 1147 (Jud. Council 9th Cir. 2009) (holding that such a
law involves both sex and sexual orientation discrimination); In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925, 929 (9th
Cir. 2009) (same).

